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Abstract:
The FED and ECB monetary policy decisions regarding
the target interest rate are one of the main drivers of global finan-
cial cycles that affect both emerging and developed economies.
Because of that, the investigation of how monetary policy deci-
sion announcements regarding official interest rate target made
by the FED and ECB spillover in both yield curves is important
for both market participants and academics. In this sense, this
work extends the monetary-jump model in León and Sebestyén
(2012) to a bivariate structure, which allows the analysis of four
objectives: (1) Assess the extent to which not anticipated mone-
tary policy decision contributes to the overall volatility in term
structure of interest rates; (2) analyze the predictability of FED
and ECB decisions and announcements; (3) assess if volatility
and monetary policy spillover effects between the US and EMU
yield curves exist; (4) identify two types of systematic jumps:
jumps specific to one interest rate and jumps that occur to both
interest rates at the same time, and assess the correlation be-
tween jumps in both markets.
The empirical evidence suggested a high level of link-
age between the two markets, especially during the world fi-
nancial crises, when correlated jumps appear to drive the jump
arrival process of both yield curves. The jump structure is very
important to explain interest rate volatility; however, unantici-
pated monetary policy decisions report a little contribution to
the overall volatility. As for the predictability of the monetary
authority, future rates do not anticipate monetary policy deci-
sions as shorter rates, indicating market participants are more
likely to change their future monetary policy expectations only
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after the statement has been released, implying future rates are
less predictable by the market participants. Monetary policy de-
cisions spillover effects were relevant to explain jumps in the
monetary authority meeting days, since foreign monetary deci-
sions appear to create more jumps in both yield curves than
the domestic monetary policy. This suggests domestic interest
rate market participants predict their domestic monetary pol-
icy better than foreign central bank decisions. Finally, regard-
ing volatility spillover effects, it can be seen that the covariance
dropped during the financial crises period, at the same time the
correlated jump intensity became large and drove both markets
jumps arrival processes. During the sample period analyzed both
individual and correlated jumps generated in the US and EMU
interest rates markets are due more to other events than to unan-
ticipated monetary policy decisions.




As decisões de política monetária do FED e ECB em
relação as suas respectivas metas da taxa de juros são um dos de-
terminantes do ciclos financeiros globais que afetam as economias
emergentes e desenvolvidas. Por conta disso, a investigação de
como as decisões de política monetária em relação a meta oficial
da taxa de juros feita pelo FED e ECB transbordam em ambas
estruturas a termo da taxa de juros é importante para os partic-
ipantes do mercado e acadêmicos. Neste sentido, este trabalho
estende o modelo monetary-jump de León e Sebestyén (2012)
para uma estrutura bivariada, permitindo a análise de quatro
objetivos: (1) Avaliar a contribuição das decisões de política mon-
etária não antecipadas para a volatilidade da estrutura a termo
da taxa de juros; (2) analisar a previsibilidade das decisões do
FED e ECB; (3) avaliar se o transbordamento de volatilidade
e política monetária entre as estruturas a termo da taxa de ju-
ros dos Estados Unidos e União Europeia existe; (4) identificar
dois tipos de saltos sistemáticos: saltos específicos a uma taxa de
juros e saltos que ocorrem em ambas taxas de juros ao mesmo
tempo, e avaliar a correlação entre os saltos nos dois mercados.
As evidências empíricas sugerem um alto nível de rela-
cionamento entre os dois mercados, especialmente durante a crise
financeira global, aonde os saltos correlacionados aparecem como
principal determinante do processo de chegada dos saltos em am-
bas estruturas a termo da taxa de juros. A estrutura de saltos
é muito importante para explicar a volatilidade das taxas de ju-
ros, entretanto, decisões de política monetária não antecipadas
reportam uma pequena contribuição para a volatilidade total.
Já em relação a previsibilidade da autoridade monetária, taxas
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de juros futuras não antecipam as decisões de política monetária
como as taxas de juros mais curtas, indicando que os partici-
pantes do mercado estão mais propensos em mudar suas expec-
tativas em relação ao futuro da política monetária apenas depois
do anúncio ser divulgado pelo Banco Central, implicando que as
taxas de juros futuras são menos previsíveis pelos participantes
do mercado.
Efeitos de transbordamento de decisões de política mon-
etária são relevantes para explicar saltos em dias de reunião da
autoridade monetária, visto que as decisões de política mon-
etária estrangeira aparentam criar mais saltos em ambas es-
truturas a termo da taxa de juros que as decisões de política
monetária doméstica. Isto sugere que os participantes do mer-
cado de taxa de juros doméstico prevem e antecipam melhor a
política monetária doméstica do que as decisões do Banco Cen-
tral estrangeiro. Finalmente, em relação aos efeitos de transbor-
damento de volatilidade, pode ser visto que a covariância entre
os mercados de juros caiu durante o período da crise financeira
global, no mesmo tempo em que a intensidade dos saltos correla-
cionados ficaram maiores e determinaram o processo de chegada
dos saltos em ambos mercados. Durante o período amostral anal-
isado, os saltos individuais e correlacionados gerados no mercado
de taxa de juros dos Estados Unidos e da União Europeia acon-
tecem mais por conta de outros eventos do que por conta de
decisões de política monetária não antecipadas.
Keywords: Decisões de Política Monetária; Transbordamento
de Política Monetária; Estrutura a Termo da Taxa de Juros
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1 Introduction
León and Sebestyén (2012) state that modern monetary
policy is much more than just changing a specific official inter-
est rate. The management of monetary policy by central banks
has become the art of shaping market expectations through the
term structure of interest rates, affecting business and household
decisions about consumption and investment and then changing
the economic aggregates and the situation of the real economy.
The design of the monetary policy decision process prac-
ticed today focuses on instruments, operating targets, intermedi-
ate targets, and policy goals. Tinbergen (1956), Mishkin (2007),
and Walsh (2010) describe the design as: From the goals of
the monetary policy authority, to the intermediate target values
needed to achieve the goals set, to the values of the operating
targets consistent to reach the intermediate targets, and finally,
to the instrument settings that yield the desired values of the
operating targets. The present analysis has the main objective
to assess the impact of a decision in one operating target (target
level for official short-term interest rates) on some intermediate
targets (short-term and long-term interest rates) of the monetary
policy.
According to Hardy (1998), government officials, finan-
cial market participants, and economic agents know how impor-
tant the target level is for an official interest rate in the conduct
of the economy. Central bank imposes the official target rate as
a monetary policy operating target. In most industrialized and
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developing countries, the monetary authority chooses the official
target rate of the economy to define which size of interference
and impact their decisions are driving the inter-bank sector and
the market expectations. The monetary authority manages the
target level for the short-term interest rates through open market
operations, defining its positions regarding the future monetary
policy and the economic outlook.
Roley and Sellon (1995) point out that in the standard
view of the monetary transmission mechanism the monetary pol-
icy decisions are transmitted to the economy through their effect
on market interest rates. A change in the target level for official
short-term interest rates may affect the economic agents’ expec-
tations that are pricing long-term interest rates and the prices of
assets in other markets. These changes have a great impact on
economic decisions based on long-term rates, such as consump-
tion decisions in sectors sensitive to future income, as durable
goods, and influence the long-term investments, responsible for
changing the supply of goods and their prices. The target level
for official short-term interest rates has become the main operat-
ing target that monetary authorities rely on to affect their goals,
such as economic growth, unemployment, and inflation.
However, as stated by León and Sebestyén (2012), the
communication to the public regarding monetary policy deci-
sions and visions about the future has become a key tool to
achieve effective implementation of monetary policy by central
banks. Communication helps manage expectations of future in-
flation level, economic outlook, and monetary policy decisions in
modern times. Different statements made by the monetary au-
thority can affect short and long-term interest rates at different
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levels, even though the decision about the official rate has been
the same. Nowadays, according to León and Sebestyén (2012):
"A monetary policy decision consists
of two parts: the first is the decision
itself whether or not to change the tar-
get rate, and if so, to what extent. The
second part is a statement which is
released with (or following) the deci-
sion and explains the rationale under-
lying the decision. Although the first
component only affects the policy rate
and very short-term market rates, it
is part of the whole decision whose
aim is to steer market expectation on
longer horizons as well, and this ob-
jective is achieved through the state-
ment. Hence, these two parts should
not be separated, since they exert in-
fluence jointly on the markets."
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) stated that, in days that
monetary policy decision announcements are released to the pub-
lic, parts of the decision were already expected by the mar-
ket, and market prices moved prior to the announcement. Price
moves that happen in those days are just the market’s reaction
to the surprise component in the news. Goldberg and Leonard
(2003) argue that, in efficient markets, yields should be influ-
enced only due to the surprise component of economic releases.
Defining the surprise component of a monetary policy decision
properly is essential to obtaining a reliable evaluation regarding
the market effects, such as prices moves, volatility moves, central
bank predictability, and monetary policy spillovers. As for the
volatility moves, when an announcement presents heterogeneity
in the interpretation, the volatility raises. If the announcement
helps clarify market views, or market participants have a com-
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mon understanding of the announcement, volatility should be
lower.
Blinder et al. (2008) argued that, over the last two
decades, communication has become an increasingly important
aspect of monetary policy actions. Communication can be a pow-
erful and important part of the central bank’s toolkit since it can
affect financial markets, improve the predictability of monetary
policy decisions, and potentially helps central banks achieve their
macroeconomic objectives. In this sense, research in the empiri-
cal literature has addressed measuring the impacts of monetary
policy decisions on asset prices, especially on interest rates. The
most general approach comprises regressing changes in interest
rates on the surprise component of monetary policy actions on
monetary meeting days. This methodology is known as “event-
study” and was first applied by Cook and Hahn (1989) and fol-
lowed by many others.
Cook and Hahn (1989) examined the response of the
short, medium, and long-term interest rates to changes in the
official interest rate of US Treasury funds during the 1970s.
The evidence found by the authors suggested the expectation
for future official target rate level strongly influences other mar-
ket interest rates. Some examples of papers that followed the
event-study approach are Thornton (1998), Bomfim and Rein-
hart (2000), Kuttner (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), and
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), among others.
Since Cook and Hahn (1989), different time-series em-
pirical approaches have been proposed to investigate the issue
of measuring the reactions of monetary policy decisions on asset
prices. Some researchers explore econometric models that control
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for the data characteristics, such as excess kurtosis and condi-
tional heteroskedasticity. A clear advantage of this approach is
to obtain more realistic estimated parameters and to assess the
effects of a monetary policy decision on conditional volatility
besides conditional mean. Also, this approach outperforms the
event-study methodology, since the latter uses only one time-
invariant coefficient to measure the unanticipated component of
the monetary policy.
This more robust empirical approach is explored in the
monetary-jump model proposed by León and Sebestyén (2012)
to analyze the effect of monetary policy surprise in the interest
rate market of the EMU (European Monetary Union). Meurer,
Santos and Turatti (2015) follow the same approach to inves-
tigate this issue in Brazil. The monetary-jump model closely
follows the methodology proposed by Chan (2002), Chan and
Maheu (2002), Chan (2003), Maheu and McCurdy (2004), and
Rangel (2011). This approach has four crucial advantages com-
pared to the event-study methodology. First, it allows the re-
searcher to assess the extent to which jumps contribute to the
total conditional volatility of an asset, in this case, interest rates.
Second, the conditional volatility is divided into two components:
a jump component that characterizes abrupt variations in the
asset and a GARCH component that captures smooth varia-
tions. Third, the frequency of surprises in the market regarding
the monetary decision may change over time, depending on the
market condition. Finally, this approach is more attractive be-
cause the excess kurtosis is treated as a systematic pattern of
the model.
Empirical literature (Das, 2002; Maheu and McCurdy,
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2004; Johannes, 2004; Beber and Brandt, 2010; Rangel, 2011;
León and Sebestyén, 2012; Meurer, Santos and Turatti, 2015)
about news being incorporated into interest rates point out that
the distinction between abrupt and smooth information flows is
very important in econometric modeling. They point out two
main reasons for this distinction. First, the monetary authority
chases the goal of shaping market expectation in a smooth way
in order to be perceived as a credible institution. Second, abrupt
changes in asset prices usually happen in the process of relevant
news being incorporated into the market. This distinct process
is treated in a parsimonious way in the monetary-jump model.
Regarding the investigation of the response of US in-
terest rate market to FED monetary policy decisions, a large
body of literature exists (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Roley and Sel-
lon, 1995; Thornton, 1998; Bomfim and Reinhart, 2000; Kuttner,
2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Das, 2002). The same follows
for the response of EMU yield curve to ECB monetary policy
decisions (Hartmann et al., 2001; Gaspar et al., 2001; Perez-
Quiros and Sicilia, 2002; León and Sebestyén, 2012). However,
few analyses gauge the extent of the reaction of both markets to
foreign monetary policy decisions (exceptions are Ehrmann and
Fratzcher 2003; Ehrmann and Fratzcher 2005).
In this dissertation, we extend previous works on mon-
etary policy decisions by considering a bivariate version of the
monetary-jump model of León and Sebestyén (2012). The bi-
variate monetary-jump model proposed here is a mixture of the
monetary-jump model proposed by León and Sebestyén (2012)
and the bivariate GARCH-jump model proposed by Chan (2002,
2003). Besides the variance-targeting scalar VECH parametriza-
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tion, this model includes a bivariate Poisson function to govern
the jump component of the model, allowing the jump intensities
to follow a time-varying autoregressive specification and generate
correlated jumps in both series in addition to each independent
jump. This model can capture smooth volatility movements, as
well as abrupt changes in the rates of return of interest rates.
The bivariate monetary-jump model considered in this
work has important advantages. Beyond the ability to capture fi-
nancial data characteristics, such as non-normality, heteroskedas-
ticity, excess kurtosis, and volatility clustering, the bivariate
monetary-jump model allows us to assess how the monetary pol-
icy decision process affects yield curves prices and volatilities, the
monetary policy decision predictability, as well as monetary pol-
icy spillover effects in order to understand how one market might
influence another, that is if a monetary policy action of ECB or
the FED regarding their own official target rate influences the
expectations of futures interest rates in the US and EMU term
structure of interest rates.
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003; 2005) stated the analysis
of news spillovers across markets allows us to assess issues regard-
ing markets linkage. First, the reaction of domestic asset prices
to foreign news reflects the degree of financial interdependence
between the two markets. Second, the analysis of news spillovers
addresses the question of why financial markets are interdepen-
dent and why interdependence may evolve. Similar to these work,
in 2003 the authors evaluated volatility spillover effects trough
a model of the GARCH family, the exponential-GARCH spec-
ification. However, in 2005 the authors used a weighted least
squares technique to make this analysis. Moreover, the bivariate
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monetary-jump model has another difference, that is the jump
component that helps assess relevant news being incorporated
to interest rate returns and volatilities.
Another reason to explore FED monetary policy co-
movements with other central banks’ monetary policies is the
important role the FED has in global financial cycles. Rey (2015)
states that the picture emerging is that of a world with power-
ful global financial cycles characterized by large common move-
ments in asset prices, capital flows, and leverage. Agrippino and
Rey (2012) state the VIX1 is a powerful index that explains an
important part of the global financial cycle, whether for flows
or for returns. In this sense, Bekaert et al. (2013), Rey (2015),
and Bruno and Shin (2015) suggest one of the determinants of
the VIX, and the global financial cycle, is the monetary policy
decision in the US regarding the official target rate. The dollar is
the main currency of global banking, so it is natural to see how
important the monetary decisions regarding the official interest
rate target in the US are to determinate credit conditions for the
global financial system. In this sense, the US monetary policy
conditions are a great determinant of risk and uncertainty and
are transmitted to the world through cross-border credit flows,
which affect the leverage of global banks and credit growth in the
international financial system, therefore inducing sharp move-
ments in both exchange rates and asset prices. These variables
are great predictors to explain financial crises, global financial
cycles, and asset moves.
León and Sebestyén (2012) argue that by studying the
extent to which monetary policy is responsible for jumps in in-
1 The VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index
and it is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
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terest rates we can analyze the predictability and effectiveness
of the monetary authority over the sample period. Moreover,
the jump dynamics explored here can provide a better under-
standing of the co-movements between US and EMU interest
rates futures markets when monetary authorities release mon-
etary policy decision announcements about the official interest
rate target, which helps understand the dynamic relationship
between jumps and volatilities. These issues have important im-
plications for risk and portfolio management, such as decreasing
the overall portfolio risk by lowering portfolio positions in assets
with the potential rise in jump and volatility movements in days
that occur monetary policy statements.
The investigation of how relevant monetary policy deci-
sion announcements, regarding official interest rate target made
by the FED and ECB spillover in yield curves, is important for
many market participants and academics. In this sense, this work
extends the monetary-jump model in León and Sebestyén (2012)
to a bivariate structure, which allows the analysis of four objec-
tives: (1) Assess the extent to which not anticipated monetary
policy decision contribute to the overall volatility in both term
structure of interest rates; (2) analyze the predictability of FED
and ECB decisions and announcements; (3) assess if volatility
and monetary policy spillover effects between the US and EMU
yield curves exist; (4) identify two types of systematic jumps:
jumps specific to one interest rate and jumps that occur to both
interest rates at the same time, and assess the correlation be-
tween jumps in both markets.
The interest rate data used in the empirical applica-
tion for the US are Treasury constant maturity rates retrieved
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from FRED database. As for the EMU, the triple-A nominal
government bond has been used. The data is provided by the
Statistical Data Warehouse of the European central bank. The
maturities used were 1, 5, and 7 years for both economic ar-
eas with daily frequency from 7 September 2004 to 6 December
2010. The number of observations is 1549. The period includes
the economic turmoil of the 2007-2008 period.
This work is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 ex-
hibits a literature review regarding monetary authority deci-
sions, communication, and monetary policy spillover. In chapter
3, the econometric analysis is detailed, making a brief review
of the event-study approach and presenting the monetary-jump
model motivation and specification. In chapter 4 the interest rate
data descriptive statistics are analyzed, and it is presented the




This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2.1
make the literature review regarding monetary authority deci-
sions. In section 2.2, the evolution and strategies of central bank-
ing communication are treated. Finally, section 2.3 brings the
discussion about monetary policy spillover.
2.1 Monetary Authority Decisions
In the standard view of the monetary transmission mech-
anism, the monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the
economy through their effect on market interest rates (Roley and
Sellon, 1995). The major influence occurs in interest-sensitive
sectors of the economy, such as housing, consumer durable goods,
and business fixed investment. The impact on these sectors is
transmitted to other sectors, affecting the total aggregate de-
mand of the economy. However, the ability of the monetary
authority to affect the economy depends on its capacity to in-
fluence market expectations, mostly regarding the future path
of the term structure of interest rates and economy outlook,
since most of the structural decisions are looking forward to the
medium and long run.
Walsh (2010) states that central banks in the major in-
dustrialized economies implement policies by intervening in the
interest rate market to achieve a target level for a short-term
interest rate. However, the monetary authority does not control
the variables that are likely to be most relevant to affect the ag-
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gregate spending, such as the nominal money supply, inflation,
or the long-term interest rates. What is left for the monetary
policymaker to take control are the reserve aggregates, such as
the monetary base, or very short-term interest rates, such as the
three ECB official key rates in the EMU and the official target
for the FFR in the US.
The actual implementation of monetary policy is com-
plex and involves many rules, traditions, and practices, usually
referred to as operating procedures. The objective in investigat-
ing these procedures is to define what instruments are actually
under the control of the central bank, what determines the op-
timal instrumental choice, and how this choice affects the way
short-term interest rates, reserve aggregates, or the money stock
might affect policy actions. Walsh (2010) synthesizes that mon-
etary policy implementation focuses on instruments, operating
targets, intermediate targets, and policy goals. Next, we detail
the definition for each one of the mentioned topics.
First, instruments are the variables directly controlled
by the monetary authority, such as interest rate charging banks
for borrowed reserves obtained from the central bank, the reserve
requirement ratios that determine the level of reserves commer-
cial banks must hold against their deposit liabilities, and the
composition of the central bank’s own balance sheet. Second,
operating targets are a measure of bank reserves or a very short-
term interest rate the policy instruments achieve. Central bank’s
goals are usually defined in terms of an inflation level or devi-
ations of unemployment from the natural rate. Finally, the in-
termediate target stays between operating targets and the mon-
etary authority goals because variables such as interest rates,
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exchange rates, and monetary aggregates, present a higher fre-
quency and have a strong relation with the central bank goals, so
the intermediate target can be seen as proxy of the less frequent
variables, such as inflation and unemployment.
The instrument choice problem is evaluated by Poole
(1970). The author presented how central banks can determi-
nate the optimal choice of monetary policy instrument in an
environment where the economy presents a stochastic structure
and disturbances with different types of nature and relative im-
portance. This environment defined in the Poole (1970) analysis
is remarkable since the central bank set the monetary policy in-
struments to achieve the operating targets before observing the
central bank’s goals outcome. Also, the central bank only has
immediately available information regarding intermediate tar-
gets, such as moves in interest rate markets interest rates, which
is not enough information to find the exact nature and relative
importance of the economic disturbance in course.
The monetary policy decision process practiced today is
defined by Tinbergen (1956) and confirmed by Mishkin (2007)
and Walsh (2010). They describe that the decision-making pro-
cess follows four steps. First, it is made the decision regarding
the goals of the monetary policy authority. Second, it is defined
the values of the intermediate targets needed to achieve the goals
set. Third, the values of the operating targets consistent to reach
the intermediate targets are decided. Finally, the choice of the
instruments settings that yield the desired values of the operat-
ing targets.
Mishkin (2007) stated the Federal Reserve Bank and
other major central banks focus on six basic goals when they
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discuss the objectives of monetary policy: (1) high employment;
(2) economic growth; (3) price stability; (4) interest-rate sta-
bility; (5) stability of financial markets; (6) stability in foreign
exchange markets. However, some conflicts among goals can oc-
cur and create hard choices for the central banks, especially in
the short run of the economy.
Regarding the choice of target variables, Mishkin (2007)
put that the monetary authority must select between two types
of variables: interest rates or aggregates (monetary aggregates
and reserve aggregates). Since central banks can choose only
one type of target variable, some rationale was needed to define
a few criteria to make this selection. The selection criteria for
the target variable are: it must be measurable, controllable, and
have a predictable effect on the goal.
The selection of interest rates over aggregates as tar-
get variable exists for several reasons. First, interest rates are
measured more precisely and are available more quickly than
the monetary aggregates (measurable criteria). Second, the cen-
tral bank can set interest rates directly affecting the price of
bonds through open market operations, and it cannot control
the money supply (controllable criteria). And finally, as for the
predictability criterion, the monetary authority wants to select
the operating target with the better predictable impact in the
intermediate target chosen, since the intermediate target is the
goal for the operating target. Normally, the desired intermedi-
ate target is an interest rate, so the preferred operating target
will also be an interest rate, such as official central bank interest
rates, which makes the monetary authority select interest rate
as target variables when looking for the predictability criterion.
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It is a consequence of a previous choice.
To represent the monetary policy decision design used
by the majority of central banks all over the most relevant economies,
Mishkin (2007) point out that:
"Suppose that the Central Bank’s em-
ployment and price-level goals are con-
sistent with a nominal GDP growth
rate of 5%. If the Central Bank feels
that the 5% nominal GDP growth rate
will be achieved by a 4% growth rate
for M2 (its intermediate target), which
will in turn be achieved by a growth
rate of 3.5% for the monetary base
(its operating target), it will carry out
open market operations (its tool) to
achieve the 3.5% growth in the mon-
etary base. After implementing this
policy, the Central Bank may find that
the monetary base is growing too slowly,
say at a 2% rate; then it can correct
this too slow growth by increasing the
amount of its open market purchases.
Somewhat later, the Central Bank will
begin to see how its policy is affecting
the growth rate of the money supply.
If M2 is growing too fast, say at a 7%
rate, the Central Bank may decide to
reduce its open market purchases or
make open market sales to reduce the
M2 growth rate."
Tinbergen (1956) classifies economic policies into three
structures, the quantitative policy, the qualitative policy, and
reforms. The second and third structures can be exemplified as
a change in the tax structure and a new social-security system,
respectively. Regarding the first structure, both means and ends
of a policy can be defined quantitatively and most research is
focused on the analysis of the relations between this ends and
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means, for example, the effects of market expectations or eco-
nomic aggregates of a change in tax rates or official interest rates.
The present work analysis follows the quantitative ap-
proach mentioned in the Tinbergen (1956) definition since the
major objective is to assess the contribution of unanticipated
monetary policy decision of the FED and ECB about official
interest rates to the overall volatility in the term structure of in-
terest rates of both economic areas. This analysis has the main
objective to assess the impact of a decision in one operating tar-
get (official short-term interest rates) on some intermediate tar-
gets (short-term and long-term interest rates) of the monetary
policy.
2.2 Monetary Authority Communication
Prior to the 1990s central banks were covered in mys-
tery because they thought that was the right thing to do (Blinder
et al., 2008). In that time, the conventional wisdom in central
banking circles held that monetary policymakers should say lit-
tle and say it cryptically. However, in the late 1990s, a new view
of how central bank’s communications should be has emerged,
suggesting monetary policymakers should pursue a greater open-
ness about decisions, because this strategy might improve the
efficiency of monetary policy, since expectations about future
central bank behavior provide the essential link between short
rates and long rates. This new view believes the central bank
should provide the market with more information about its own
understanding of the fundamental factors guiding monetary pol-
icy. This new idea was an attempt to create a virtuous circle
that allows markets to follow central bank’s expectations, which
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eventually would turn the central bank predictions of the mone-
tary policy goals less difficult, facilitating the monetary authority
necessity to shape market expectations in a smoother way.
Blinder et al. (2008) argued that, over the last two
decades, communication has become an increasingly important
aspect of monetary policy actions. Communication can be a pow-
erful and important part of the central bank’s toolkit since it can
move financial markets to improve the predictability of mone-
tary policy decisions and potentially help central banks achieve
their macroeconomic objectives. The authors define central bank
communication as the information that the monetary authority
releases to the public, regarding specific matters, such as the
objectives of monetary policy, the monetary policy strategy, the
economic outlook, and the outlook for future policy rates deci-
sions.
This revolution in thinking about monetary policy com-
munications created a new era of transparency that began in the
major central banks in the world. Public announcements regard-
ing decisions of official interest rates were released with state-
ments that included assessments of the central bank’s bias to
future changes in monetary policy. As for the FED, these resolu-
tions started in February 1994. As for the ECB, the transparency
of monetary policy decisions began since it opened its doors in
1998. Another driver for increasing transparency were the theo-
retical arguments asking for independent central banks because
this view states that the monetary authority must explain their
actions and their thinking that underlie those actions.
Blinder et al. (2008) define two approaches, known as
"creating news" and "reducing noise", used to evaluate how cen-
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tral bank communication can manage market expectations. Stud-
ies that investigate how central bank communication "create
news" analyze, for example, how announcements influence asset
price moves. On the other hand, research of "reducing noise" fo-
cuses, for example, on how monetary authority announcements
increase the predictability of central bank actions and reduce
financial markets volatility.
Another major discussion of Blinder et al. (2008) is what
constitutes optimal communication strategy. There are two main
strands in the literature. The first focuses on the impacts of cen-
tral bank communication on financial markets. As for the second
line of research, they focus on how differences in communication
strategies across monetary authorities or across time reflect in
different economic performance. Although this increasing look
to monetary policy communication, the authors state the con-
stitution of a consensus regarding the optimal communication
strategy must emerge since many communication strategies are
suggested across central banks.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) conducted research with
a "reducing noise" approach. The authors analyzed how central
banks should communicate. They concluded that monetary au-
thority committee responsible for the monetary policy decision
took a communication strategy more individualistic or collegiate.
The collegiate communication strategy is when a conveying con-
sensus of members is transmitted. On the other hand, the in-
dividualistic approach happens when members express a diver-
sity of views about monetary policy and economic outlook. The
purpose of their work was to analyze which communication ap-
proach is more effective in raising the predictability of markets,
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regarding the upcoming monetary policy and economic outlook.
The authors looked at the communication strategy of
the monetary policy decision committee members of the Federal
Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European central bank.
The period analyzed was from January 1999 to May 2004, and
fundamentally different strategies were found between the cen-
tral banks in this period. FED members express personal views
in the inter-meeting period of monetary policy decisions in a
more individualistic approach, but the ECB and Bank of Eng-
land members followed a more collegiate strategy, where state-
ments regarding their decisions reflected the views of the com-
mittee.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) found three major re-
sults: (1) Communication that is dispersed and expresses many
views about monetary policy decisions reduces the predictabil-
ity of upcoming decisions of monetary policy; (2) communica-
tion dispersion about the economic outlook improve the market
ability to anticipate the future path of interest rates and mon-
etary policy; and (3) a higher frequency of communication in
an inter-meeting period has helped markets better anticipate
monetary policy decisions. These results suggest the monetary
authority should distinguish between these two types of commu-
nication, regarding monetary policy and economic outlook, to
achieve greater effectiveness in the monetary policy and imple-
ment more announcements in inter-meeting periods.
Bernoth and Hagen (2003) also used the "reducing noise"
type of research to analyze the impact of ECB monetary policy
announcements on three aspects of the predictability of the Eu-
ribor futures market. The first was the efficiency of the three-
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month Euribor interest rate futures market, the second was the
effect of ECB policy announcements on the volatility of Euri-
bor futures rates, and finally was the effect of ECB policy an-
nouncements on the prediction error in Euribor futures rates.
The authors analyzed the nineteen futures contracts of three-
month Euribor rates settled between March 1999 and September
2003.
The empirical results obtained by Bernoth and Hagen
(2003) suggest: (1) Euribor futures rates with a forecast horizon
up to four months are unbiased with efficient predictors of fu-
ture spot rates; (2) futures rates changes at ECB meeting days
shows most ECB policy decisions were anticipated correctly by
the markets, remaining only a few surprises with low volatil-
ity; (3) the predictability of ECB policy decisions seems to have
improved during the first years of the EMU; (4) market partici-
pants in the new euro interest rate markets - after EMU started
- could reduce the prediction error for short-term rates.
A number of studies also followed the "creating news"
approach that investigates the impact of central bank’s com-
munication in asset prices moves. Brand, Buncic and Turunen
(2010) used intraday interest rate market data on monetary pol-
icy days to construct indicators of news about ECB monetary
policy to study their impact on the euro area yield curve. The
authors’ results suggested, that during the ECB press confer-
ence, the market expectations of the path of monetary policy
may change considerably. This effect can be seen on longer-term
yields. Another result is that news stemming from ECB com-
munication matters more for long-term interest rates than news
about monetary policy decisions.
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Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) work is another example
of research that followed the "creating news" approach. The au-
thors investigate how the monetary policy decisions of the ECB
affected the yield curve in the euro area on days the central bank
releases the public statement regarding this information. They
followed the event-study methodology and found that, in ECB
decision meeting days, the yield curve presents a lower impact
than in days of other monetary policy shocks.
This work focuses on the investigation of the impact
the US and EMU yield curves suffer on days the FED and ECB
announcements, regarding official interest rate decisions, are re-
leased to the public. Due to the empirical methodology that was
chosen, it is also possible to analyze the extent to which this
communication affects interest rate market prices and volatility,
the monetary policy decision predictability, and monetary policy
spillovers. These factors combined create an interesting analysis
that mixes the "creating news" and "reducing noise" approaches.
2.2.1 Announcements and the Surprise Component of Mon-
etary Policy Decision
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) point out that on days
that monetary policy decision announcements are released to the
public, part of the decision is already expected by the market,
and market prices moved prior to the announcement. Price move-
ments that happen in those days are the market reaction to the
surprise component in the news. Goldberg and Leonard (2003)
argue that, in efficient markets, yields should be influenced only
by the surprise component of economic releases. Because of that,
it is fundamental to model the arrival of news information to as-
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sess how monetary policy affects interest rate markets.
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) used a survey from Reuters
as their expectations measure, so that the surprise component
of monetary policy decision is the difference between the actual
decision and the expectations measure. 1 The authors defined, if
the expectations lie within an interval of 12.5 basis points above
or below the decision announced, the monetary policy decision
is considered anticipated by the market. The expectations data
allowed the investigation regarding the predictability of the mon-
etary policy decisions. Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) tested the
unbiasedness and efficiency of the survey data and found the
Reuters survey presents a good quality as they got good results
in the tests applied.
However, Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) argue that the
accuracy of the expectation measure may not capture the mar-
ket expectations precisely. This idea surged since their estimated
coefficient does not reflect a one-to-one relation between an un-
expected change in the policy rate and a change in the short in-
terest rate. One reason for this result may be because this survey
was conducted prior to the announcements, and market expec-
tations can change in the meantime. In this sense, defining the
surprise component of monetary policy decision properly is es-
sential to obtain reliable evaluation regarding the market effects,
such as prices moves, volatility moves, central bank predictabil-
ity, and monetary policy spillovers.
Another difference between the empirical approach adopted
1 Reuters survey is based on a poll of 25-30 market participants that ex-
press their expectation for the monetary policy decision. Reuters con-
ducted this survey on Fridays before each meeting about central bank
decision.
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in this work and the majority of communication existing liter-
ature is the evaluation of announcements effects on the condi-
tional volatility of interest rates. Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003)
argue that the volatility effects of announcements depend on the
heterogeneity of beliefs and expectations of market participants.
Volatility rises when an announcement presents heterogeneity in
the interpretation. On the other hand, if the announcement helps
clarify market views and market participants have a common
understanding of the announcement, volatility should be lower.
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) results show monetary policy de-
cision reduced the domestic volatility in the period covered, and
the transatlantic volatility spillovers have also declined.
2.3 Monetary Policy Spillover
The analysis of interest rate market reactions to both
domestic monetary news and foreign monetary policy decisions
is presented by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003). Precisely, the
authors investigated how interest rate markets in the US, Ger-
many, and the Euro area react to monetary policy announce-
ments made by the FED, Bundesbank, and ECB. They used
a bivariate exponential GARCH (E-GARCH) structure to ana-
lyze the level of interdependence between interest rate markets,
regarding domestic and foreign monetary policy decisions. This
methodology allowed the author to measure news and spillover
effects for the conditional means and the conditional variances.
The period of scheduled and unscheduled meetings covered was
from January 1993 to February 2002 (1993-1998 for Germany,
1999-2002 for the Euro area, and 1993-2002 for the US). The
selected period made it possible to compare the situation before
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and after the EMU.
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) stated three channels
exist through which foreign announcements, regarding monetary
policy decisions, may affect domestic markets; they defined this
channels as:
"First, foreign news may be relevant
for domestic monetary policy authori-
ties if these target ’external’ variables,
such as the exchange rate. Second, the
integration of global financial markets
might lead to spillover effects. A change
in monetary policy in the US, for in-
stance, will affect interest rate mar-
kets in other countries via capital flows
and the elimination of arbitrage possi-
bilities. A third channel works through
real integration, namely if foreign mon-
etary policy decisions change domes-
tic macroeconomic conditions, for ex-
ample, through effects on trade with
the other country. In this sense, for-
eign monetary policy decisions may
provide news not only about economic
conditions abroad but also about the
prospects of the domestic economy."
The results presented by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003)
suggested interest rates respond strongly to domestic monetary
policy. However, the effect of news, regarding the foreign mone-
tary policy decisions, also exists but varies through the markets
analyzed by the authors. FED announcements affect the Ger-
man and the Euro area yield curves, whereas the US interest rate
market rarely responds to ECB and Bundesbank decisions. An-
other major result is that only the German interest rate market
presented a volatility increase when the domestic central bank
released the statement. This fact may exist because monetary
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policy strategies and decisions of the FED and ECB became
clearer to the market participants over time, generating lower
volatility and less uncertainty on days around policy decisions.
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) find that, after the EMU,
a greater interdependence between US and Euro area yield curves2
occurred and a much larger level of volatility were transmitted
from one market to the other. Also, FED news carries over to
the euro area at all maturities, but ECB statements of monetary
policy decision affect the US market only at short maturities.
Over time, market understanding and anticipation of domestic
and foreign monetary policy decisions have improved with the
general linkage of these interest rate markets.
Rigobon and Sack (2004) estimated the response of asset
prices to changes in monetary policy. The authors developed
a new estimator that is based on the heteroskedasticity that
exists in high-frequency data, and they implemented this method
using two alternative approaches - simple instrumental variables
regression and generalized method of moments. The research
reported that the response of market interest rates and equity
prices to changes in monetary policy can be identified based on
the increase in the variance of policy shocks that occurs on days
of FOMC meetings and of the Chairman’s semi-annual monetary
policy testimony to US Congress.
Rigobon and Sack (2004) results indicated that an in-
crease in US short-term interest rates results in a decline in stock
prices and in an upward in the US and Euro yield curve that be-
2 The market interest rates Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003) used were in-
terbank rates for Germany (FIBOR) and the euro area (EURIBOR), and
treasury bill rates for the USA, all of which are available at maturities
of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months.
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comes smaller at longer maturities. According to the estimates,
a 25 basis point increase in the three-month interest rate results
in a 1.7% decline in the S&P 500 index and a 2.4% decline in
the Nasdaq index. As for the market interest rates, a 25 basis
points increase in the three-month US rate results in an increase
of more than 25 basis points in near-term Eurodollar futures
rates, with similarly increases in short- and intermediate-term
Treasury yields. However, for both money markets, the effect
gradually diminishing as the contract horizon lengthens.
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2005) is another example of
research that looks at the interdependence between the US and
the Euro area yield curves, regarding the effects of monetary
policy decisions. However, the authors also analyzed the impacts
of macroeconomic news. The authors found that implementing
the EMU increases the interdependence between US and Euro
area daily interest rates. Spillover effects from the US to the
EMU are stronger than in the opposite direction. However, the
developments in the Euro area markets spillover to the US. They
covered the yield curves for the period 1993 to 2003.
To identify why the US and EMU interest rate markets
have become more interdependent and why some US news has
turned into such important determinants of EMU yield curve,
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2005) argue that some US announce-
ments are released before Euro area news, suggesting that US
news has become a leading indicator for the Euro area partic-
ipants in the formation of their expectations. This hypothesis
may be, in part, explained by the increased real integration of
the two economies.
Another reason for the increasing interdependence be-
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tween US and EMU is the role of the FED monetary policy deci-
sions in global financial cycles. Bruno and Shin (2015) state that
FED monetary policy decisions determine the leverage appetite
of global banks since banks are intermediaries in the financial
system and their financing costs are closely tied to the official
interest rate chosen by the FED. In this sense, monetary pol-
icy may directly affect the economy through greater risk-taking
by the banking sector. The authors report that a contractionary
shock to FED monetary policy leads to a decrease in cross-border
capital flows in the banking sector. The global financial cycle fol-
lows the FED monetary policy decision regarding the target rate
and is described by Bruno and Shin (2015):
"Lowering of bank funding costs in fi-
nancial centers gives an initial impe-
tus for greater risk-taking in cross-border
banking, and any initial appreciation
of the currency of the capital-recipient
economy strengthens the balance sheet
position of the borrowers. From the
point of view of the banks that have
lent to them, their loan book becomes
less risky, relaxing the funding con-
straints for banks and creating spare
capacity to lend even more. In this
way, the initial impetus is amplified
through a reinforcing mechanism in
which greater risk-taking by banks damp-
ens volatility, which elicits even greater
risk-taking, thereby completing the cir-
cle."
This information regarding the transmission of FED
monetary policy through international capital flows is impor-
tant to evaluate the linkage between US and EMU interest rate
market, since international capital flows affects the increase of
leverage and creates a sharp, real appreciation of currencies for
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the recipient economies, factors that are significant predictors
of financial crises, creating both assets and macroeconomic vari-
ables fluctuations (Gourinchas and Obstfeld 2012). In this sense,
FED monetary policy decisions, regarding the official interest
rate target, affect the EMU interest rate market through the
three channels reported by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003).
In other words, FED monetary policy decisions became
an essential external variable that influences ECB decisions (First
Channel). Moreover, FED decisions have a major role determin-
ing both global financial cycles integration (Second Channel) and
real integration between US and EMU economies (Third Chan-
nel). This happens because of the influence that FED decisions
have in cross-border capital flows, financial markets fluctuations,
and domestic macroeconomic variables.
The belief the ECB monetary policy follows the FED
decisions is widely spread with market participants. However,
supporting this view empirically is not an easy task. Belke and
Gros (2005) investigated through Granger causality tests if the
proposition that a systematic asymmetric leader-follower rela-
tionship exists between the ECB and the FED can be verified.
This supposed overview it is not confirmed by the authors. They
conclude the relationship between the interest rate decisions of
the FED and the ECB change over time.
Belke and Gros (2005) covered the period from 1989 to
2003 and find evidence of a significant influence of the US on
the EMU after September 2001. Little was found in the other
direction. The author stated it is hard to determine the deeper
reasons for changes in correlations over time. However, since the
asymmetric leader-follower relationship appears only after a ma-
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jor shock that increases global risk and uncertainty, the reason
for this phenomenon may be the less flexibility of the Euro area
economy.
This leader-follower relationship between the FED and
ECB in times that occur common shocks, especially those that
increase global risk and uncertainty, may also be explained be-
cause of the "option value of waiting" strategy of the ECB. This
means that the ECB reacts later to global shocks that create
a large degree of uncertainty. So, during the firsts periods post
shock, FED monetary policy decisions tend to drive ECB deci-
sions.
In this section, was covered some reasons why is impor-
tant to investigate the monetary policy spillover effects between
the FED and ECB. It is presented the current literature that
points out the existence of three channels through which for-
eign announcements, regarding monetary policy decisions, may
affect domestic markets. Moreover, was presented some factors
that put FED monetary policy decisions responsible for foreign
interest rate market fluctuations.
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3 Econometric Analysis of Mon-
etary Policy Decisions
In this section, the two main methodologies used to as-
sess monetary policy decisions will be discussed. First, the event-
study approach and several works mentioned in the literature
will be reviewed. Second, limitations regarding the event-study
methodology and how the monetary-jump model can improve
this issues will be exposed. Moreover, the importance of using
the bivariate monetary-jump model to evaluate monetary deci-
sions spillover will be addressed. Finally, the econometric model
specification and the existing literature employing the monetary-
jump model will be presented.
3.1 Event-Study Approach
The methodology proposed by Cook and Hahn (1989)
is predominant to assess the market reaction to the monetary
policy. The evidence presented supports the theory of expecta-
tions and corroborate the findings from other studies about the
effect of monetary policy on market interest rates. The authors
found that for the US bond market, the shorter the maturity,
the greater the impact of changes in the official interest rate. In
their approach, the change in market interest rate is a function
of the change in the official target rate. Formally,
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Δ𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽Δ𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, (1)
where Δ𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the change in market interest rate with maturity i,
Δ𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the change in the official target rate and 𝛽 measure
the monetary policy surprise.
Many authors followed the methodology proposed by
Cook and Hahn (1989). Dale (1993) measured the response of
short-term market interest rates to the Bank of England actions
regarding monetary policy. The author found evidence support-
ing the idea that the effect of monetary policy decisions has less
influence for longer maturities.
Another example in the international literature is Roley
and Sellon (1995). The authors investigated the relationship of
monetary policy decisions on long-term interest rates. The au-
thors argued that the standard vision about the transmission
mechanism of the monetary policy is based on a consistent rela-
tionship between monetary policy decisions and agents’ expec-
tations in the interest rate market, i.e., the monetary authority
uses a policy with strong and positive effect on the level of the
term structure of interest rates.
Unlike previous empirical literature showing long-term
interest rates had a weak and insignificant connection to changes
in monetary policy decisions, the analysis made by Roley and
Sellon (1995) suggests a strong connection, in which, long rates
seem to anticipate changes in monetary policy, moving in ad-
vance to the policy implemented by the monetary authority.
Following the methodology proposed by Cook and Hahn
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(1989), Balduzzi, Bertola and Foresi (1994) explore the relation-
ship between the official target rate on the overnight FED Funds1
and long-term maturity rates. Hardy (1998) developed a tech-
nique to separate the anticipated and unanticipated components
of changes in the official target rate and estimated the response
of interest rates in the German market to changes in the official
target rate of the German central bank.
Thornton (1998) investigated the reactions of short and
long-term interest rates to changes in the FED funds official tar-
get rate. The analysis was made from October 1989 to December
1997 and focused on three points: (1) if the interest rate market
reaction varies with the magnitude of target rate changes; (2)
if the reaction is larger when accompanied by a discount rate2
change; (3) if the reaction is larger when there is a policy rever-
sal. The author reported the size of the target rate change does
not appear to affect the market reaction, discount rate changes
seem to matter for the inflation outlook, and finally, changes in
policy increase market rate reactions.
Bomfim and Reinhart (2000) examined the effects on
asset prices of greater transparency in the FED communication
regarding monetary policy decisions. The authors covered the
period from 1989 up to 1999 and found that, after 1994, this
new strategy of openness was implemented. Bomfim and Rein-
hart (2000) concluded that the press releases have not been spe-
1 FED funds official overnight rate target is imposed by the Federal Re-
serve Bank itself
2 The FED discount rate is the interest rate set by the FED on loans
offered to eligible commercial banks or other depository institutions as
a measure to reduce liquidity problems and the pressures of reserve re-
quirements. The discount rate allows the FED to control the supply of
money and is used to assure stability in the financial markets.
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cific enough to shape market expectations in any consistent and
significant manner since monetary policy announcements in that
period were not generating a significant effect on financial mar-
ket prices.
Kuttner (2001) also follows a similar methodology ap-
plied by Cook and Hahn (1989) and Hardy (1998) to evaluate
the anticipated and unanticipated components of the decisions
made by the monetary authority about the FED official target
rate. Kuttner (2001) found a large and significant relationship
between unanticipated components of monetary policy and mar-
ket interest rates. The author argued surprise target rate changes
help to explain the short end of the yield curve, however, have
little effect on expectations of future monetary policy decisions.
Analyzing the equity prices reaction to changes in mon-
etary policy decisions, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) found a
strong and consistent response of the stock market to FED un-
expected monetary policy decisions. The author found that an
unexpected 25-basis-point target rate cut of the FED would lead
to an increase in stock prices on the order of one percent. The
authors reported monetary policy surprises create different re-
actions across industry-based portfolios.
3.1.1 Event-Study Approach in Brazil
Following the traditional methodology introduced by
Cook and Hahn (1989), many authors sought to analyze the dy-
namics of the market reaction to changes in the Brazilian mone-
tary policy. Tabak (2004) and Buchholz et. al. (2012) employed a
similar methodology to test market reaction to changes in official
target rate by the Brazilian central bank.
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Oliveira and Ramos (2011) made an adaptation of Kut-
tner (2001) for the Brazilian market to identify unanticipated
monetary shocks to investigate how the domestic yield curve re-
acts to these shocks. As expected, the unanticipated component
of the monetary policy generated shocks (i.e., surprise in the
market) and affected the term structure of interest rates.
Unanticipated monetary shocks are defined by the au-
thors as the difference between the average overnight rates before
and after the COPOM meeting disclosure. To obtain the market
reaction to these monetary surprising shocks, the authors esti-
mated the correlation between market surprises and the term
structure of interest rates, using interest rates future contracts
with alternative maturities.
Focusing the analysis on the period after the introduc-
tion of Brazilian inflation targeting regime, Nunes, Holland and
Silva (2011) analyzed how official target rate decisions affected
the yield curve. The authors concluded that the surprise effect on
the yield curve was lower than the past because the market could
adjust their expectations about the COPOM decisions much ear-
lier than before the inflation target regime was implemented. The
authors found that the explanatory power of the monetary policy
decisions increased after the inflation target regime used by the
Brazilian central bank, and that the monetary policy surprises
in Brazil affected the yield curve, although this effect diminishes
for longer maturities.
3.2 Monetary-Jump Model Approach
In this section, the motivation behind the choice of not
using the event-study approach in favor of the monetary-jump
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model to assess the market reaction to the monetary policy de-
cision will be discussed. Moreover, the motivation for extending
the monetary-jump model to a bivariate structure will be men-
tioned.
The decision in favor of the monetary-jump model is
based on two major facts. First, the methodology introduced by
Cook and Hahn (1989) presents an important limitation. The
unanticipated component of monetary policy is measured by a
single factor that does not vary in time. This limitation is im-
portant as it variations are expected to happen over time in
the market reaction, regarding the decisions of monetary pol-
icy, due to changes in market expectations and macroeconomic
conditions. So, the unanticipated component of monetary policy
cannot be modeled by a time-invariant structure. Second, the
interest rate data usually display features such as the charac-
teristic of non-normality, excess kurtosis, heteroskedasticity, and
volatility clustering. Note that both factors are overcome in the
methodology proposed by León and Sebestyén (2012) to measure
the unanticipated component of monetary policy.
The monetary-jump model used here is also known as
the GARCH-jump model. Empirical literature (Das, 2002; Chan,
2002; Chan and Maheu, 2002; Chan, 2003; Maheu and McCurdy,
2004; Johannes, 2004; Matovu, 2007; Beber and Brandt, 2010;
Rangel, 2011; León and Sebestyén, 2012; Meurer, Santos and
Turatti, 2015) left plenty of arguments to support this modeling
strategy:
(1) The monetary-jump model mixes smooth volatility
movement in the GARCH structure with abrupt changes in re-
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turns in the jump part. The variance3 of the interest rate re-
turn will be driven not only by the variance of the normal dis-
turbances but also by the jumps dynamics. This is important
because central banks want to shape market expectations in a
smooth way; however, sometimes, the process of news being in-
corporated into the market can generate abrupt movements in
asset returns;
(2) ARCH and GARCH models have been mostly influ-
ential in the empirical literature that use economic and financial
data. This parsimonious structure implies heteroskedasticity and
volatility clustering, i.e. periods of high (low) volatility are likely
to be followed by periods of high (low) volatility;
(3) The Poisson-jump structure is useful to accommo-
date stylized facts of the data, such as abrupt changes in interest
rates. Press (1967) introduced an independent process with the
arrival of jumps governed by a Poisson distribution so that ex-
cess kurtosis can be accommodated by a systematic pattern and
not only by a fat tail distribution;
(4) The monetary-jump model allows for a structure
with time-varying jump intensities controlling the arrival of jumps,
which helps to understand the relationship between the jump
dynamics and volatilities. This structure captures changes over
time that may exist in market conditions and in the frequency
of surprises;
Although a vast literature exists on the response of do-
mestic interest rate markets to domestic monetary policy de-
3 In the bivariate structure, the covariance between two assets will be
driven not only by the covariance between the normal disturbances but
also by the jumps dynamics.
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cisions (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Balduzzi, Bertola and Foresi,
1994; Roley and Sellon, 1995; Thornton, 1998; Gaspar et al.,
2001; Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Das, 2002;
Perez-Quiros and Sicilia, 2002; Bernoth and Hagen, 2003; Brand,
Buncic and Turunen, 2010; León and Sebestyén, (2012); Meurer,
Santos and Turatti, 2015), relatively little is known about the
reactions of yield curves to foreign monetary policy decisions
(exceptions are Ehrmann and Fratzcher, 2003; Ehrmann and
Fratzcher, 2005).
Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2003; 2005) stated that the
reaction of domestic asset prices to foreign news reflects the
degree of financial interdependence between the two markets.
Rey (2015), Miranda Agrippino and Rey (2012), Bekaert et al.
(2013), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and Bruno and Shin
(2015) point out that FED monetary policy decisions are a great
determinant of risk and uncertainty sentiment and indicate the
cost of credit for global banks. These two factors are important
as global banks define the quantity of loans they want to be ex-
posed, which helps define the credit leverage ratio, gross capital
flows, and exchange rates for advanced and emerging economies,
all great predictors of financial crises and responsible for the
global financial cycles and asset moves.
The investigation of how relevant monetary policy de-
cision announcements - regarding official interest rate target
made by the FED and ECB - spillover in both interest rate
markets is important for many market participants and to the
economic theory. In this sense, this work extends the monetary-
jump model presented in León and Sebestyén (2012) to a mul-
tivariate structure, in particular, the bivariate parametrization,
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which allows the analysis of four major factors: (1) assess the
extent to which unanticipated monetary policy decision con-
tributes to the overall volatility in term structure of interest
rates; (2) analyze the predictability of FED and ECB decisions
and announcements; (3) assess if volatility and monetary pol-
icy spillover effects between the US and EMU yield curves exist;
(4) identify two types of systematic jumps: jumps specific to
one interest rate and jumps that occur to both interest rates at
the same time and assess the correlation between jumps in both
markets.
3.3 Econometric Specification of the Bivariate Monetary-
Jump Model
The fundamental idea of the bivariate monetary-jump
model is to assess how domestic monetary policy decisions spillover
to a foreign interest rate market, therefore affecting the dynam-
ics of jumps, returns, and volatilities of interest rates. The model
employed in this work is a mixture of models specifications, such
as the bivariate GARCH-jump model used by Chan (2002;2003),
and the univariate monetary-jump model used by León and
Sebestyén (2012) and Meurer, Santos and Turatti (2015).
We begin by specifying the components of returns. Given
an information set at time 𝑡− 1, which consists of the history of
returns 𝜑𝑡−1 = (𝑟𝑡−1, ..., 𝑟1), the two stochastic innovations, 𝜖1,𝑡
and 𝜖2,𝑡, drive interest rates returns in a process of the form:
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𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇+ 𝜖1,𝑡 + 𝜖2,𝑡, (2)
where 𝑟𝑡 is a 2 x 1 vector of returns consisting of a constant
mean 𝜇, a random disturbance 𝜖1,𝑡, and a jump innovation 𝜖2,𝑡.
The impact of unobservable normal news innovations is assumed
to be captured by the return innovation component 𝜖1,𝑡. This
component of the news process drives smoothly evolving changes
in the conditional variance of returns. The second component
of the latent news process,𝜖2,𝑡, drives infrequent large moves in
returns. The impacts of these unusual news events are reffered
to as jumps.
The random disturbance, 𝜖1,𝑡, and the jump innovation,
𝜖2,𝑡, follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean and
variance covariance matrix 𝐻𝑡 and Δ𝑡, respectively. The normal
disturbance are assumed to be contemporaneously independent
of the jump innovation.
In the monetary-jump model proposed here, it is pos-
sible to model the characteristics of the time series of interest
rates and create an internal structure to assess the effect of the
surprise component of the market. This component is treated
as the jump structure and is defined as the days in which the
ex-post probability of at least one jump is bigger than 50%.
The subsections that follow describe our parametriza-
tion for these two stochastic components of returns. Subsection
3.4.1 begin specifying the process governing jumps and the distri-
bution of jump sizes. Subsection 3.4.2 describe the time-varying
jump intensity structure. Section 3.4.3 specify the conditional
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variance dynamics of both components. Finally, subsection 3.4.4
threat the model estimation with the construction of the log-
likelihood function and the filter that allow us to optimally infer
when jumps arrive.
3.3.1 The Jump Innovation and Jump-Size Distribution
Within any single time period 𝑡, an interest rate may
experience 𝑛 number of jumps depending on the news content
entering the market. The jump component is constructed as a
sum of a series of random variables 𝑌𝑖:
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌1 + 𝑌2 + 𝑌3 + ...+ 𝑌𝑛, (3)
each of these random variables can be interpreted as a jump size
which is governed by a normal distribution with constant mean
𝜐 and constant variance 𝛿2. The jump-size distribution for the
two interest rates can be characterized as,
𝑌1𝑡,𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(𝜐1, 𝛿21), (4)
and
𝑌2𝑡,𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(𝜐2, 𝛿22), (5)
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where 𝑖 and 𝑗 correspond to each series of random jumps. The







Therefore, the jump innovation 𝜖2,𝑡 in period 𝑡 is ex-
pressed in a bivariate framework as,
𝜖2,𝑡 = 𝐽𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1[𝐽𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1] =
[︃ ∑︀𝑛1𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑌1𝑡,𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡−1(
∑︀𝑛1𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑌1𝑡,𝑖)∑︀𝑛2𝑡






which is the sum of the stochastic 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 jumps, which

















so that 𝜖2,𝑡 is conditionally zero mean. In other words, the jump
component enters the mean equation with an expected value of
zero, which is achieved by subtracting the expected value from
the series of random jumps 𝐸𝑡−1[𝐽𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1].
The two discrete counting variables 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 govern-
ing the arrival of jumps between [𝑡 − 1, 𝑡] are constructed via
three independent Poisson variables, namely 𝑛*1𝑡, 𝑛*2𝑡, and 𝑛*3𝑡.
The later Poisson variable, 𝑛*3𝑡, is the one responsible for govern
the common jumps that create correlation between 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡.
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Each one of these variables is distributed as a Poisson random
variable with parameter 𝜆𝑖 > 0 and probability density function
given by
𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝|𝜑𝑡−1) =
𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑝𝑖
𝑝! . (9)
The expected value and variance of 𝑛*𝑖𝑡 are each equal
to 𝜆𝑖𝑡, which is also referred to as the expected number of jumps
or the jump intensity. 𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑛*𝑖𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1) can be measured as the
ex ante number of jumps between the period [𝑡 − 1, 𝑡] for the
Poisson variable 𝑖. The joint probability density function for the
three independent Poisson variables is








The correlated jump intensities are defined as a bivari-
ate Poisson process of the form:
𝑛1𝑡 = 𝑛*1𝑡 + 𝑛*3𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 = 𝑛*2𝑡 + 𝑛*3𝑡 (11)
By construction, each of these counting variables, 𝑛1𝑡
and 𝑛2𝑡, is capable of generating independent jumps as well as
correlated jumps. The independent jumps are initiated by 𝑛*1𝑡
and 𝑛*2𝑡 in the time period 𝑡. The correlated jumps are pro-
duced by the additional Poisson variable 𝑛*3𝑡 which contributes
to jumps in both series. Using the change of variables method
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and integrating out 𝑛*3𝑡 yields the joint probability density func-
tion for 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 as:









(𝑖− 𝑘)!(𝑗 − 𝑘)!𝑘! ,
(12)
and the expected number of jumps is equal to
𝐸(𝑛1𝑡) = 𝜆1 + 𝜆3, (13)
and
𝐸(𝑛2𝑡) = 𝜆2 + 𝜆3. (14)
3.3.2 Modeling Time-Varying Jump Intensity
Since the frequency and the probability of jumps may
change over time depending on the market conditions and mone-
tary policy surprises, it was allowed all three Poisson parameters
to vary over time. The same time-varying jump intensity spec-
ification was used for the two independent jump and for the
correlated jump. The autoregressive conditional jump intensity
(ARJI) structure introduced by Chan and Maheu (2002) and
used by Chan (2003) and Maheu and McCurdy (2004) was con-
sidered in this work.
The conditional jump intensity, 𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑛*𝑖𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1), is
the expected number of jumps conditional on the information
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set 𝜑𝑡−1. The dynamics governing 𝜆𝑖𝑡 are parameterized in the
ARJI framework as a process in the form:







the conditional jump intensity for the Poisson variable 𝑛*𝑖𝑡 at time
𝑡, 𝜆𝑖𝑡, is related to 𝑟 past lags of conditional jump intensity and 𝑠
past lags of the intensity residual, 𝜉𝑖𝑡. In the estimation process,
the length of both lags is set to 𝑟 = 𝑠 = 1. A natural measure of
the persistence of this process is 𝜁𝑖. The restrictions 𝜁𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖 = 0
yield a constant jump intensity structure. 𝜉𝑖𝑡−𝑝 represents the
innovation to 𝜆𝑖𝑡 as measured ex post by the econometrician.
This measurable shock, or jump intensity residual, is the unpre-
dictable component affecting the inference about the conditional
mean of the counting process 𝑛*𝑖𝑡, which is defined as,
𝜉𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝐸[𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1|𝜑𝑡−1]− 𝜆𝑖𝑡−1 =
∞∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑗𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑗|𝜑𝑡−1)− 𝜆𝑖𝑡−1,
(16)
where 𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑗|𝜑𝑡−1) is called the filter and is our ex post
inference on 𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1 given time 𝑡− 1 information. 𝐸[𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1|𝜑𝑡−1] is
our ex post assessment of the expected number of jumps that
occurred from 𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 − 1. 𝜆𝑖𝑡−1 is by definition the con-
ditional expectation of 𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1 given the information set 𝜑𝑡−2.
Therefore, 𝜉𝑖𝑡−1 represents the change in the econometrician
conditional forecast of 𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1 as the information set is updated
(𝜉𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝐸[𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1|𝜑𝑡−1]−𝐸[𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1|𝜑𝑡−2]). A stationary restriction
to ensure that 𝜆𝑖𝑡 > 0, for all 𝑡, can be set with the sufficient
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conditions 𝜆0 > 0, 𝜁𝑖 ≥ 𝛾𝑖, and 𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0. To estimate the three
equation of the ARJI model, one for each Poisson variable 𝑛*1𝑡,
𝑛*2𝑡 and 𝑛*3𝑡, starting values of 𝜆𝑖𝑡 must be set. We set 𝜆𝑖1 to
the unconditional jump intensity value in equation (17). The
unconditional jump intensity is equal to
𝐸[𝜆𝑖𝑡] =
𝜆𝑖𝑡
1− 𝜁𝑖 . (17)
As for the jumps size means, a constant specification
for all jump arrival process was used. The time-varying jump
intensity structure of this work followed the specifications set by
Chan and Maheu 2002, Chan 2003, and Maheu and McCurdy
2004.
3.3.3 Conditional Variance Dynamics
The conditional variance of returns is decomposed into
two separate components: a smoothly conditional variance com-
ponent for the normal disturbance and the conditional variance
component related to the jump innovation. The conditional vari-
ance of returns is
𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1) = 𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝜖1,𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1) + 𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝜖2,𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1). (18)
The first component of the conditional variance of re-
turns, 𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝜖1,𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1), is defined by the variance-covariance ma-
trix 𝐻𝑡 that follows a variance-targeting scalar VECH specifica-
tion suggested in Engle and Mezrich (1996),
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𝐻𝑡 = (1− 𝛼− 𝛽)𝐶 + 𝛼(𝜖1𝑡−1𝜖′1𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐻𝑡−1, (19)




1𝑡. The estimated parameters in the
structure are 𝛼 and 𝛽. Covariance-stationarity is obtained through
the restriction 𝛼+ 𝛽 < 1.
The second component of the conditional variance of re-
turns, 𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝜖2,𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1), is defined by the variance-covariance ma-
trix for the jump innovation,Δ𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡. This term is derived from the
assumption that the correlation between the jump sizes is con-
stant across contemporaneous equations and zero across time,
i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑌1𝑡, 𝑌2𝑡) = 𝜌12 and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑌1𝑡, 𝑌2𝑠) = 0 , 𝑡 ̸= 𝑠. There-
fore, conditional on i and j independent jumps and k correlated
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The variance covariance matrix 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 that represents
the full monetary-jump model will always be positive definite
as long as 𝐻𝑡 is positive definite. By construction, the variance
covariance matrix for the jump component Δ𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 is well defined
given i, j, and k jumps and, therefore, 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 as the sum of two
positive definite matrix will be positive definite, i.e.
𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 +Δ𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡. (21)
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The second moment of returns can be specified as:
𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝑟1,𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1) = 𝜎21,𝑡 + (𝜆1𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑡)(𝜐21 + 𝛿21), (22)
𝑉 𝑎𝑟(𝑟2,𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1) = 𝜎22,𝑡 + (𝜆2𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑡)(𝜐22 + 𝛿22), (23)
where 𝜎21,𝑡 and 𝜎22,𝑡 are the main diagonal components of the
variance-covariance matrix 𝐻𝑡, 𝜆1𝑡, 𝜆2𝑡 and 𝜆3𝑡 are the expected
number of jumps, 𝜐21 and 𝜐22 are the squared jump mean parame-
ters, 𝛿21 and 𝛿22 are the jump variance parameters for the two Pois-
son processes. The second term in the right-hand side of equation
(22) and (23), namely (𝜆1𝑡+𝜆3𝑡)(𝜐21+𝛿21) and (𝜆2𝑡+𝜆3𝑡)(𝜐22+𝛿22),
are the jump contribution to the total conditional variance of re-
turns.
3.3.4 Model Filter and Estimation
Having observed 𝑟𝑡 and using Bayes rule we can infer
the ex-post probability that 𝑗 jumps occurred at time 𝑡, with the
filter defined as,
𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗|𝜑𝑡−1) =
𝑓(𝑟𝑡|𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗, 𝜑𝑡−1)𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗|𝜑𝑡−1)
𝑃 (𝑟𝑡|𝜑𝑡−1) , j = 1,2,3 ...,
(24)
where 𝑓(𝑟𝑡|𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗, 𝜑𝑡−1) denote the conditional density of return
given 𝑗 jumps occur, and the information set 𝜑𝑡−1. This filter is
an important component because it can be used for inference on
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future occurrences of jumps. The probability that at least one
jump occurs can be obtained from
𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) = 1− 𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝜑𝑡−1), (25)




𝑗𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗|𝜑𝑡). (26)
Combining the GARCH model with the jump process,
the probability density function for 𝑟𝑡 given 𝑖 independent jumps
in the first interest rate, 𝑗 independent jumps in the second inter-
est rate, and 𝑘 correlated jumps in both interest rates is defined
as,





where 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 is the usual error term with the jump component:
𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 = 𝜖*𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 =
[︃
𝜖*1𝑡 − (𝑖+ 𝑘)𝜐1 + (𝜆1𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑡)𝜐1




and 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡 is defined in (21). Finally, to complete the specifica-
tion, the conditional density of returns is defined as








𝑓(𝑟𝑡|𝑛*1𝑡 = 𝑖, 𝑛*2𝑡 = 𝑗, 𝑛*3𝑡 = 𝑘, 𝜑𝑡−1)
× 𝑃 (𝑛*1𝑡 = 𝑖, 𝑛*2𝑡 = 𝑗, 𝑛*3𝑡 = 𝑘|𝜑𝑡−1). (29)
In the estimation process, we assume that the maximum
number of jumps (i,j,k) between the period [t-1,t] is two, in or-
der to simplify the evaluation of the sums of equation (29). The
likelihood function represents the likelihood of the parameters
set given the observed data set 𝑟𝑡. In order to facilitate the cal-
culation it is used the log-likelihood function, that is simply the





3.4 Existing Literature Employing the Monetary-Jump
Model
León and Sebestyén (2012) investigated the effect of
the unexpected component of ECB monetary decision announce-
ments into the Euro bond market through different models spec-
ifications. The author’s used daily observations of the Euro area
interest rate market for maturities up to one year and inter-
est rate swap contracts for maturities from one to ten years in
the period of February 1999 to June 2010. The authors esti-
mated four models with the univariate structure: (1) A model of
constant volatility; (2) a GARCH model; (3) a monetary-jump
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model with constant volatility; (4) a monetary-jump model with
constant jump intensity.
The authors found evidence that the model that bet-
ter explains interest rates variations on European markets is
the monetary-jump model that allows for the jumps to be time-
varying and dependent on monetary policy surprises. This model
has better performance than the traditional event-study frame-
work found in the literature. León and Sebestyén (2012) con-
cluded that the monetary-jump model outperforms specifica-
tions without the jump structure.
León and Sebestyén (2012) results suggest the ECB
monetary policy decisions appear to contribute significantly to
the arrival of jumps in the European interest rate market. The
authors found the following results for the univariate monetary-
jump model with Euro data: (1) the jump intensity parame-
ters were insignificant only for the 10-year maturity and remain
highly negatively significant for the other maturities; (2) the con-
tribution of jumps to total volatility decreases with maturity; (3)
in around a quarter of ECB meeting days occurred at least one
jump in interest rate market rates, while in the 2-year yield the
proportion was only 1/20; (4) the financial turmoil, such as the
2007/2008, make the identification of jumps more difficult; jumps
are less likely to occur in interest rate market over crisis periods;
(5) the number of jumps on ECB meetings days rise in financial
distress periods but follow no clear path between maturities.
Meurer, Santos and Turatti (2015), implement a monetary-
jump model similar to León and Sebestyén (2012) for the Brazil-
ian interest rate market. The authors measured the jump con-
tribution to the total volatility in the term structure of interest
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rates on the Brazilian inter-bank market and assessed the extent
to which non-anticipated COPOM monetary policy decisions are
driving these jumps. A major advantage of this approach is that
it uses specification for jumps intensities and jumps mean that
vary over time and are a function of the first two principal com-
ponents of the yield curve. Jumps that contribute to measuring
the total volatility of interest rates depend on the level and slope
factor of the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. This spec-
ification is also useful to capture how the market expectations
are changing.
Maheu and Mccurdy (2004) investigated how news ar-
rival impact on returns and volatilities of individual stocks and
indexes through a univariate GARCH-jump model. The latent
news process is postulated to have two separate components,
normal and unusual news events, with different impacts on re-
turns, expected volatility, and higher-order moments of the re-
turn distribution. The authors found evidence suggesting time
dependence in jump intensities for the assets analyzed, using an
autoregressive conditional jump intensity parametrization. Ma-
heu and McCurdy (2004) found that the GARCH-jump mixture
model provides superior out-of-sample conditional variance fore-
casts than a benchmark asymmetric GARCH model with fat-
tailed innovations.
Beber and Brandt (2010) reported results on jumps pa-
rameters for the US Treasury bond futures contracts with dif-
ferent maturities, confirming that expanding the GARCH spec-
ification with a term that allows for abrupt variations is impor-
tant. For all maturities, the authors find sharp rises in jumps
parameters for US macroeconomic announcements, such as the
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Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Employment Report, and the
Producer Price Index (PPI). They observe that jumps intensities
are higher for longer maturities and decrease for shorter maturi-
ties. The authors investigated daily prices from the 1980s to 2003
and found negative values for jump mean estimates in all matu-
rities because shorter maturities are presented with less negative
values. The average jump contribution to total volatility is lower
for longer maturities, and the probability of jumps occurring on
the same day of a macroeconomic announcement is higher for
longer maturities.
Rangel (2011) examined the effect of macroeconomic re-
leases on stock market volatility through a univariate GARCH-
jump model with time-varying jump intensity. The fundamental
variables considered in the paper include measures of inflation
(CPI, PPI), employment (NFP Employment and an Index of Un-
employment), and short-term interest rates (FFR). The author
reported that, in days of announcements, little impact was found
on jump intensities, and the jump intensity responds asymmet-
rically to macroeconomic shocks. Rangel (2011) pointed out the
relevance of incorporating heterogeneous news events to explain
different volatility patterns and suggested that jumps play an
important role in explaining the effects of market volatility of
macroeconomic events that surprise market participants. The
author stated the information of macroeconomic surprises has
predictive power for jump probabilities that leads to volatility
forecast improvements on event days.
Chan (2002, 2003) presented the bivariate GARCH-jump
model to analyze smooth and abrupt volatility dynamics in the
exchange rate returns. The author assessed the conditional corre-
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lation in the jumps dynamics between two distinct returns series.
In the presence of jumps, the covariance matrix between curren-
cies is not only driven by the covariance between the normal
disturbances, but also by the characteristic of jumps correlation.
The bivariate GARCH-jump model can be useful to price as-
sets, model the risk premium in foreign exchange options, and
to model the optimal hedge rate in the commodities market.




This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.1
presents the interest rate data analysis and section 4.2 reports
the evaluation of FED and ECB announcements regarding mon-
etary policy decision during the sample period. Finally, section
4.3 reports the results of the bivariate monetary-jump model
previously discussed.
4.1 Interest Rate Data
The interest rate data for the US are Treasury constant
maturity rates retrieved from FRED which is the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis database. As for the EMU it is used constant
maturity rates of the triple A nominal government bond. The
data is provided by the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB.
The maturities used were 1, 5 and 7 years for both economic ar-
eas with daily frequency from 7 September 2004 to 6 December
2010. The total number of observation is 1549. The period in-
cludes the economic turmoil of the 2007/2008 as well as a variety
of economic and market conditions.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) put that the drawback
of using daily frequency rather than intra-day or tick-by-tick
data is that with a lower frequency data the noise is higher be-
cause other events are not captured as well as news that occurs
during the day, thereby possibly making the measurement of an-
nouncement spillover less accurate. However, such noise occurs
less in interest rate markets than in other financial markets, and
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the empirical literature often uses daily frequency data to cap-
ture jump movements in interest rates (Das 2002, Johannes 2004,
Matovu 2007, Beber and Brandt 2010, León and Sebestyén 2012,
Meurer, Santos and Turatti 2015).
Table 1 below reports summary statistics for the interest
rates series both in levels and in first differences. It is also in-
cluded the Jarque-Beta normality test for the percentage change
data, and the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation in first differ-
enced data and in squared first differenced data to check for AR
and ARCH effects, respectively.
The Jarque-Beta test checks if the data has skewness
and kurtosis of a normal distribution (null hypothesis), while
the Ljung-Box tests the null hypothesis of no serial correlation
in the data. These statistics give us essential information about
the data characteristics that needs to be taken into consideration
during the process of modeling selection.
These results in Table 1 indicate that the data shows
no normality, excess kurtosis and heteroskedasticity. The critical
value of the Jarque-Beta normality test is 5.9531 for all matu-
rities. Table 1 reports that all maturities exceeded the critical
value with 1% of significance. It is also reported in table 1 that all
maturities have excess kurtosis with respect to that of a normal
distribution.
Table 1 reports that the Ljung-Box test for ARCH ef-
fect in all maturities found the presence of heteroskedasticity.
Therefore, all maturities exceeded the critical value of 31.4104
with 1% of significance. As for the Ljung-Box test for AR ef-
fect, only the 7-year Treasury rate, the 5-year and 7-year EMU
government bond do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial
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Figure 1 – United States Maturities in level










Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of interest rates in levels and in first difference.
US - level EMU - level
1 year 5 year 7 year 1 year 5 year 7 year
Mean 2.6303 3.3784 3.6881 2.4322 3.1842 3.4696
Standard Deviation 1.8429 1.1373 0.9010 1.3125 0.7365 0.5763
Sample Variance 3.3964 1.2934 0.8118 1.7226 0.5425 0.3321
Kurtosis 1.4308 1.7703 2.1154 1.5977 2.3482 2.6885
Skewness -0.0081 -0.2017 -0.3132 -0.1326 -0.1937 -0.2582
US - first difference EMU - first difference
1 year 5 year 7 year 1 year 5 year 7 year
Mean -0.1207 -0.1259 -0.1052 -0.1080 -0.0931 -0.0764
Standard Deviation 4.9722 6.9728 6.9106 3.2234 4.2339 3.9628
Sample Variance 24.7225 48.6204 47.7557 10.3904 17.9262 15.7036
Kurtosis 21.2161 6.2320 6.4843 16.1436 4.0711 3.7285
Skewness 0.1131 -0.1548 -0.2421 -1.2453 0.0369 0.0756
Jarque-Beta 2141.9833* 680.3796* 798.6680* 1154.9391* 74.3919* 35.7200*
Ljung-Box (AR effect) 83.4534* 34.7790** 27.0407**** 136.6791* 29.9555*** 26.8951****
Ljung-Box (ARCH effect) 646.0576* 512.8975* 369.4145* 156.3873* 493.7223* 221.9370*
Note: Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of interest rates in levels and in first difference, such as the mean, standard deviation,
sample variance, kurtosis, skewness, Jarque-Beta normality test, and Ljung-Box serial correlation test. *, **,
*** and **** denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. Ljung-Box serial correlation critical
value is 31.41 for both maturities and effects. Jarque-Beta normality test critical value is 5.95 for all maturities.
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In Figures 1 and 2 it is plotted the Treasury constant
maturity rates in levels and first difference. It is also plotted
in Figures 3 and 4 the EMU triple A nominal government bond
rates. The level of Treasury rates started to fall sharply in middle
2007 due to the financial turmoil, as well as the variance in the
same period. The sharp movement in the EMU bond started
later, around middle 2008. Moreover, the variance also increased
in the EMU bond market during the financial crisis period.
4.2 Announcements of monetary policy decision
All publicly available statements of monetary policy meet-
ings made by the FED in the US and by the ECB in the EMU
from September 2004 to December 2010 are analyzed. It is tak-
ing into account three important factors of announcements: (1)
Only official announcements of the decision-making meetings of
the two central banks are analyzed; (2) FED and ECB present
a different frequency of decision-making meetings; (3) the time
zone between the countries define which day the market reacts
to the monetary policy decision.
One point that must be noticed is when the announce-
ment was made and the time zone between the countries. The
time of the press conference about monetary policy decisions
made by the FED is 2:15 p.m. in the city of Washington/DC
and most statements released regarding the ECB decisions is
made at 2:30 p.m. in the city of Frankfurt; however, the ECB
sometimes conducts the meetings in other major cities of Eu-
rope, such as Brussels, Berlin, Madrid, Paris, Dublin, Vienna,
Athens, and Luxembourg. The time zone between these cities in
Europe and the east coast of the United States are 5, 6, or 7
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Figure 3 – EMU Maturities in level
Figure 4 – EMU Maturities in first difference
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FED 52 Unchanged 27
Increase 15
Decrease 10
ECB 76 Unchanged 60
Increase 9
Decrease 7
Notes: The table reports the number of meetings that the FED
and ECB performed during the sample period
analyzed, and their respective decisions regarding the target rate.
hours. Therefore, the announcements made by the ECB affects
the United States interest rate market in the same day. The
opposite, however, is not true, since FED releases strike the Eu-
ropean bond market in the opening of the next day. Both central
bank’s decisions reach their own market in the same day.
During the period analyzed, the frequency of meetings
diverged between the ECB and the FED. ECB meetings take
place in the first week of every month, or 12 times per year.
FED meetings occur 8 times per year. Another difference be-
tween their decisions is the FED decides the official target for
the federal fund’s rates, whereas the ECB decides on three of-
ficial key rates1 in the same meeting. To measure how often
the official rate was unchanged or changed, it has been taken
into account only the marginal lending facility rate, which offers
overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem.
1 ECB official key rates are the interest rates on the main refinancing
operations, the deposit facility rate and the marginal lending facility
rate.
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Table 2 reports the total number of decision-making
meetings and the monetary authority decision regarding the offi-
cial target rate. For the period analyzed, the ECB conducted 76
meetings, while 52 were fulfilled by the FED. Both central banks
maintained the official target rate unchanged most of the time;
this happened 78.94% for the ECB and 51.92% for the FED.
Official target rate increased 28.84% for the FED and 11.84%
for the ECB. The remaining decision of decreasing the official
target rate was taken 19.23% for the FED and 9.21% of ECB
decision-making meetings.
4.3 Results
This section is divided into two subsections. Subsec-
tion 4.3.1 reports the results for the bivariate monetary-jump
model with constant jump intensity. After that, subsection 4.3.2
presents the results for the most sophisticated structure of the
monetary-jump model that allows for time-varying jump inten-
sity with the ARJI specification.
4.3.1 Monetary-Jump Model with Constant Jump Intensity
Table 3 reports parameter estimates of the bivariate
monetary-jump model with constant jump intensity and con-
stant jump mean along with the value of the log-likelihood func-
tion evaluated at the estimated parameters. T-statistics appear
in parenthesis. It is used the same maturity of both economic ar-
eas (US and EMU) as the two variables in the estimation process
of the bivariate monetary-jump model.
First, it can be seen that the three jump intensity pa-
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rameters are not statistically significant for the 1-year maturity
but highly significant for all jump intensity parameters in the 5-
year maturity and only for the two individuals jump intensities
in the 7-year maturity. For the 5-year maturity, the correlated
jump intensity parameter, 𝜆3, exhibits a higher value than both
individual parameters, suggesting that correlated jumps appear
to be important in explaining the daily variations in both mar-
kets 5-year interest rate maturity.
As for the GARCH parameters, 𝛼 and 𝛽, both are sig-
nificant for all maturities. The jump mean and jump variance
parameters, 𝜐1, 𝜐2, 𝛿21 and 𝛿22 , seem to get smaller the higher
is the maturity, indicating that jumps are more important in
shorter maturities. The jump correlation parameter, 𝜌, is sta-
tistically different from zero only for the 5-year and 7-year ma-
turity, and both are shown negative value, -0.4416 and -0.4012,
respectively, implying that when jumps occur the two interest
rates returns series tend to move in opposite directions. This
may happen due to difference in the timezone between the mar-
kets, since FED statements are released when the EMU bond
market it is already close, affecting the interest rate returns only
on the next day, i.e. FED releases a surprising announcement
regarding a change in the FED funds official target rate, the
US interest rate market participants respond to the news mov-
ing interest rates returns on the same day of the announcement.
However, due to the difference in the time zone, EMU interest
rate market participants incorporate the FED news only in the
next day, creating jumps in the EMU interest rate returns in a
difference day that jumps occur in the US interest rate returns.
Table 4 shows the jump analysis statistics concerning
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Table 3 – Bivariate monetary-jump model with constant
jump intensity.







































































lnL -874.4 -4697.4 -4683
Notes: The table 4 reports parameter estimates for the bivariate
monetary-jump model with constant jump intensity and jump
mean. 𝑡-Statistics appear in parentheses and 𝑙𝑛𝐿 denotes the
value of the likelihood function evaluated at the estimated
parameters. The model is defined as 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇+ 𝜖1,𝑡 + 𝜖2,𝑡, where
𝜖1,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡𝑧𝑡, 𝜖2,𝑡 =
[︂ ∑︀𝑛1𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑌1𝑡,𝑖 − (𝜆1 + 𝜆3)𝜐1∑︀𝑛2𝑡
𝑗=1 𝑌2𝑡,𝑗 − (𝜆2 + 𝜆3)𝜐2
]︂
, 𝑧𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1),
𝑌𝑡,𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(𝜐, 𝛿2), where 𝑌𝑡,𝑖𝑗 is the jump-size distribution for the
two interest rates. 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 are Poisson processes with
constant jump intensities (𝜆1 and 𝜆3) and (𝜆2 and 𝜆3),
respectively. 𝐻𝑡 follow a variance-targeting scalar VECH
specification, 𝐻𝑡 = (1− 𝛼− 𝛽)𝐶 + 𝛼(𝜖𝑡−1𝜖′𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐻𝑡−1. It is
assumed that 𝑧𝑡, 𝐽𝑡 and 𝑛𝑡 are independent.
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monetary policy decisions. The number of jumps in the US and
EMU are the number of days on which the sum of the ex-post
probabilities of at least one jump on (𝑛*1𝑡 + 𝑛*3𝑡) and (𝑛*2𝑡 + 𝑛*3𝑡)
is higher than 50%, respectively. One jump can be characterized
as
𝑃 (𝑛*1𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) + 𝑃 (𝑛*3𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) > 0.5, (31)
and
𝑃 (𝑛*2𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) + 𝑃 (𝑛*3𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) > 0.5, (32)
The number of jumps on FED and ECB meeting days
overall meeting days is the ratio of the number of jumps on the
monetary authority meeting days to the total number of meet-
ing days that occur in analyzed period. To calculate the cross-
border statistics, the difference in the timezone between the two
economic areas has been taken into consideration. ECB meeting
days generate jumps in the US interest rate market in the same
day. However, US meeting days generate jumps in the ECB in-
terest rate market only in the next day. Finally, the average jump
contribution to total US and EMU volatility are respectively
√︀
(𝜆1 + 𝜆3)(𝜐21 + 𝛿21)√︀




(𝜆2 + 𝜆3)(𝜐22 + 𝛿22)√︀
𝜎2 + (𝜆2 + 𝜆3)(𝜐22 + 𝛿22)
. (34)
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where 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 are the main diagonal components of the variance-
covariance matrix 𝐻𝑡, 𝜆1, 𝜆2 and 𝜆3 are the expected number
of jumps, 𝜐21 and 𝜐22 are the squared jump mean parameters, 𝛿21
and 𝛿22 are the jump variance parameters for the two Poisson
processes.
The average jump contribution to total volatility for
the US in both markets is higher for the 1-year maturity, reach-
ing 0.9853, which implies that jumps are the main driver of the
volatility for that maturity. As for the 5-year and 7-year maturi-
ties, a smaller value is obtained, but still very large contribution
from jumps for the total volatility in those maturities.
The total number of jumps and the number of jumps on
FED and ECB meetings days overall meeting days appear to in-
crease with maturity. In the Treasury 7-year maturity, jumps in
the US occur on 23% of FED monetary policy decision announce-
ments and on 30% of ECB meetings. This information suggests
that monetary policy surprises are more pronounced in the long
term rates, implying that the FED and ECB monetary policy
decisions have a higher impact in future market expectations af-
ter the announcement. This occurs because future rates do not
anticipate monetary policy decision as shorter rates, indicating
that agents are more likely to change their future monetary pol-
icy expectations only after the statement been released.
The EMU interest rate market appears to follow the
same path in the sample period analyzed but with one important
difference. This change concerns the fact that the average jump
contribution to total volatility in the EMU interest rates seems
to remains almost constant with maturity. The total number of
jumps and the number of jumps in EMU rates on ECB and FED
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Table 4 – Jump analysis for the bivariate monetary-jump
model with constant jump intensity.
Maturity 1-year 5-year 7-year
Average jump contribution to
total volatility - US 0.9853 0.8238 0.8454
Number of jumps - US 14 267 426




Number of jumps in US
on ECB meetings days 1 17 23
Number of jumps in US
on ECB meeting days over
all ECB meeting days
0.0132 0.2237 0.3026
Average jump contribution
to total volatility - EMU 0.6179 0.6347 0.6358
Number of jumps - EMU 18 294 392




Number of jumps in EMU
on FED meetings days 1 19 21
Number of jumps in EMU
on FED meeting days over
all FED meeting days
0.0192 0.3654 0.4038
Notes: The table reports the jump analysis for the bivariate monetary-
jump model with constant jump intensity and jump mean regarding
the FED and ECB meetings about the monetary policy decision.
The number of jumps in the US is the number of days on which the
sum of the ex-post probabilities of at least one jump on 𝑛*1𝑡 and 𝑛*3𝑡,
𝑃 (𝑛*1𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) + 𝑃 (𝑛*3𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1), is higher than 50%. The average








, respectively. The number of jumps on
meeting days overall meeting days is the ratio of the number of jumps
on meeting days to the total number of meeting days.
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meeting days overall meeting days also increase with maturity.
In the 7-year maturity, jumps occur in 25% of ECB meetings
days and in 40% of FED statements days. This result suggests
that EMU long-term interest rates expectations are also more
likely to change after the meetings.
In both interest rate markets, the probability of jumps
in the domestic market is higher when the foreign monetary au-
thority releases a decision statement. For instance, in the 5-year
and 7-year US Treasury rates, jumps occur in 13% and in 23%
of FED meetings days, respectively, and in 22% and in 30% of
ECB meetings days, respectively. As for the 5-year and 7-year
EMU interest rates, jumps occur in 21% and in 25% of ECB
meetings days, and in 36% and in 40% of FED meetings days,
respectively. This may occur because domestic market partici-
pants might anticipate with higher precision their domestic cen-
tral bank monetary policy.
Finally, the number of jumps in the EMU interest rate
market on FED meeting days overall FED meeting days is higher
than the impact of ECB decisions in terms of the number of
jumps in the US Treasury rates for all maturities. These suggest
that the relative importance of the FED monetary policy for the
EMU interest rate market participants is higher than the ECB
decisions for the US interest rate market participants. Another
possibility is that US interest rate market participants antici-
pate ECB monetary policy decisions with higher precision than
EMU interest rate market participants anticipate FED decisions
regarding changes in the official target rate.
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4.3.2 Monetary-Jump Model with Time-Varying Jump In-
tensity
Table 5 reports the estimated parameters for the bi-
variate monetary-jump model with time-varying jump intensity
and constant jump mean for the three maturities considered.
Although not all jump intensity parameters in the ARJI frame-
work reports statistical significance, it is important to highlight
that the majority are significant. For the 1-year maturity, the pa-
rameters presented the greater consistency, only the parameter
𝜁1, a natural measure of the US jump intensity persistence, was
not statistically significant. Next, it is reported all jump intensi-
ties equations for the 1-year maturity with their own respective
parameters and 𝑡-statistics values:
𝜆1,𝑡 = 0.0006(59.45) + 0.0001(0.002)𝜆1,𝑡−1 + 0.9266(21.19)𝜉1,𝑡−1
(30)
𝜆2,𝑡 = 0.0017(25.78) + 0.1130(14.33)𝜆2,𝑡−1 + 0.5861(144.0)𝜉2,𝑡−1
(31)
𝜆3,𝑡 = 0.0133(49.54) + 0.6082(77.19)𝜆3,𝑡−1 + 0.0094(61.69)𝜉3,𝑡−1
(32)
For the 5-year maturity, only two jump intensity param-
eters were statistically significant. The first was the intensity
residual parameter, 𝛾2, for the EMU jump intensity equation,
and the second was the correlated jump intensity persistence
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parameter, 𝜁3. Moreover, for the 7-year maturity, a few parame-
ters were reported not statistically significant, these parameters
are 𝛾1 for the US jump intensity equation; 𝜁2 for the EMU jump
intensity equation; 𝜆31 and 𝛾3 for the correlated jump intensity
equation.
Figures 5 to 9 reports the time-varying jump intensity
for the two individual jump processes as well as the correlated
jump process in the 7-year maturity. Moreover, for the same
maturity, it is also presented the time-varying jump intensity
for the EMU and US interest rate2. Correlated jumps appear to
drive the US and EMU jump intensity processes since all three
figures show an increase in the jump intensities in the financial
crises period. This characteristic suggests that in world financial
crises the correlated jump intensity seems to be more important
than individuals jump generating processes.
The process that originates correlated jumps reports the
trend of growth starting close to June 2007 (observation 700),
peaking nearly September 2008 (observation 1000) and returning
to the original place nearly in April 2010 (observation 1400). This
trend indicated that the 2008 financial turmoil presented the
characteristic of contagious between the US and EMU interest
rate market, reinforced what actually happened in this period.
This trend can be seen in other figures presented here, such as
the ex-post number of jumps and the ex-post probability of at
least one jump occurring.
Table 6 reports the remain parameters estimates for the
bivariate monetary-jump model with time-varying jump inten-
2 𝜆1,𝑡 and 𝜆2,𝑡 are the individuals jump intensity processes and 𝜆3,𝑡 is the
correlated jump intensity process. US jump intensity is 𝜆1,𝑡 + 𝜆3,𝑡 and
EMU jump intensity is 𝜆2,𝑡 + 𝜆3,𝑡.
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Table 5 – Jump intensity parameters of the bivariate
monetary-jump model with variant jump inten-
sity - ARJI structure.
































































Notes: The table reports parameter estimates for the ARJI
time-varying jump intensity structure. 𝑡-Statistics appear in
parentheses. Each one of the three Poisson variables parameters
(𝜆1𝑡, 𝜆2𝑡, and 𝜆3𝑡) that govern the arrival of jumps between [𝑡− 1, 𝑡]
for the three counting process, (𝑛*1𝑡, 𝑛*2𝑡, and 𝑛*3𝑡), here represented
as the US, the EMU, and the correlated counting process, are modeled




𝑝=1 𝛾𝑖𝜉𝑖𝑡−𝑝 ; where 𝜉𝑖𝑡−𝑝
represents the innovation to 𝜆𝑖𝑡 as measured ex post by the
econometrician. This measurable shock, or jump intensity residual,
is the unpredictable component affecting the inference about the
conditional mean of the counting process 𝑛*𝑖𝑡, which is defined as,
𝜉𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝐸[𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1|𝜑𝑡−1]− 𝜆𝑖𝑡−1 =
∑︀∞
𝑗=0 𝑗𝑃 (𝑛*𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑗|𝜑𝑡−1)− 𝜆𝑖𝑡−1.
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Figure 5 – 7-year maturity:
Jump inten-
sity for EMU -
𝜆2,𝑡 + 𝜆3,𝑡.
Figure 6 – 7-year maturity:
Jump inten-
sity for US -
𝜆1,𝑡 + 𝜆3,𝑡.
Figure 7 – 7-year maturity:
Jump intensity










Figure 9 – 7-year maturity: Jump intensity for the correlated
jump arrival process - 𝜆3,𝑡.
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sity and constant jump mean as well as the log-likelihood values
for the three maturities considered. The jump mean and jump
variance parameters for both countries indicate to follow the
same pattern of the monetary-jump model with constant jump
intensity. 𝜐1, 𝜐2, 𝛿21 and 𝛿22 decrease with higher maturities and
are statistically different from zero. This demonstrates that jump
movements in longer-term rates are less sharp and less variant
than in short-term rates in the sample period analyzed.
Moreover, the GARCH parameters are reported in table
VI. Where the parameter 𝛼 shows statistical significance only for
the 1-year maturity, while 𝛽 is reported highly significantly for
all maturities. As for the estimated jump correlation parameter,
𝜌, it is reported negative values for the 5-year and 7-year maturi-
ties as well as in the monetary-jump model with constant jump
intensity structure, and the parameter is significantly positive
for the 1-year maturity. For the two long-term maturities, the
second model got similar results to the first estimated model. As
in Chan (2003) investigation of currencies returns, if the jump
correlation parameter (𝜌) is reported negative, the correlation
between interest rates returns decreases when the size of the
correlated jump intensity become large. This characteristic can
be seen in figure 10, that reports the covariance between both
countries 7-year interest rate maturity. The covariance drop dur-
ing the financial crises period, the same time that the correlated
jump intensity becomes large and drive both countries jump ar-
rival processes. This information may help diversify risk in port-
folio management.
Negative jump correlation parameter on long-term ma-
turities it is more expected since the presence of jumps it is
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Figure 10 – 7 year maturity: monetary-jump covariance for US
and EMU.
larger than the 1-year maturity on days that the monetary pol-
icy meet, suggesting that market participants change their view
of long-term maturities only after the announcement been re-
leased. Beyond the timezone argument to explain the negative
jump correlation parameter, another suggestion may be the dif-
ference packages of economic recovery measures implemented
by the FED and ECB after the crises, and their impact on long-
term interest rates. The Quantitative Easing (QE) program was
launched by the FED in late November 2008, and was aggres-
sively extended in the following years to respond to the financial
and economic problems in the US after 2008. The measures taken
allowed US Treasury long-term interest rates to be quickly af-
fected after the financial turmoil, a fast drop in this assets level
prices occurred after 2008. As for the ECB QE package, it was
started in may 2009 with the purpose of purchasing corporate
debt. Only in January 2015 that the ECB introduce a more
aggressive program to purchase EMU bonds from central gov-
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ernments, thus affecting long-term interest rates in a stronger
way after the sample period analyzed here.
Concerning the jump analysis for the second model, it
is reported in table 7 similar results to the first model, however,
two differences are presented. First, FED monetary policy deci-
sions affect the EMU interest rate market participants with the
same importance that the ECB meetings impact the US Trea-
sury market agents. For the 5-year and 7-year, the number of
jumps at the US Treasury rate in ECB meeting days overall
ECB meeting days are 25% and 30%, respectively. As for the
number of jumps in FED meeting days at the EMU market, the
values are 23% for the 5-year and 30% for the 7-year maturity.
Second, for the EMU rates, the number of jumps on ECB meet-
ing days overall meeting days is higher in the 5-year maturity
than in the 7-year maturity, which implies that this is the EMU
rate with fewer anticipations regarding the ECB monetary deci-
sions in the sample period analyzed, occurring jumps in 19.74%
of meeting days, being that in the 7-year maturity this value
drop to 18.42%. The pattern of the number of jumps on meeting
days increasing with maturity does not happen only in this case.
However, the majority of the jump analysis statistics
stay with the same pattern that it is reported in the monetary-
jump model with constant jump intensity. Follow below the five
points of the jump analysis with the same pattern.
(1) The average jump contribution to total volatility in
both markets is higher for the 1-year maturity. Reaching 98%
for the US Treasury and 60% for the EMU triple-A government
bond.
(2) The number of jumps in both interest rate market
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Table 6 – Bivariate monetary-jump model with variant
jump intensity and constant jump mean for US
and EMU data.


















































𝑙𝑛𝐿 -860.238 -4690.2 -4677.5
Notes: The table 6 reports parameter estimates for the bivariate
monetary-jump model with time-varying jump intensity.
𝑡-Statistics appear in parentheses and 𝑙𝑛𝐿 denotes the
value of the likelihood function evaluated at the estimated
parameters. The model is defined as 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇+ 𝜖1,𝑡 + 𝜖2,𝑡, where
𝜖1,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡𝑧𝑡, 𝜖2,𝑡 =
[︂ ∑︀𝑛1𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑌1𝑡,𝑖 − (𝜆1𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑡)𝜐1∑︀𝑛2𝑡
𝑗=1 𝑌2𝑡,𝑗 − (𝜆2𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑡)𝜐2
]︂
, 𝑧𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1),
𝑌𝑡,𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(𝜐, 𝛿2), where 𝑌𝑡,𝑖𝑗 is the jump-size distribution for the
two interest rates. 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 are Poisson processes with
time-varying jump intensities (𝜆1𝑡 and 𝜆3𝑡) and (𝜆2𝑡 and 𝜆3𝑡),
respectively. 𝐻𝑡 follow a variance-targeting scalar VECH
specification, 𝐻𝑡 = (1− 𝛼− 𝛽)𝐶 + 𝛼(𝜖𝑡−1𝜖′𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐻𝑡−1. It is
assumed that 𝑧𝑡, 𝐽𝑡 and 𝑛𝑡 are independent.
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rise with maturity. For the US market, the number of jumps goes
from 20 in the 1-year maturity to 459 jumps in the 7-year matu-
rity. Moreover, for the EMU interest rate market, the number of
jumps goes from 23 in the 1-year maturity to 278 in the 7-year
maturity.
(3) Foreign monetary authority decisions generate more
surprise in domestic interest rate market participants than the
domestic monetary authority. The only exception is 1-year EMU
bond, in which the ECB has more effect than the FED. For ex-
ample, for the 7-year US Treasury maturity, the number of jumps
on FED meeting days overall meeting days reaches 23% while
this ratio for the ECB meetings reaches 30%. As for the 7-year
EMU bond, the number of jumps on ECB meeting days overall
meeting days is 18%, and for the FED meetings affect the ratio
is 30%. This information indicates that market participants pre-
dict their own monetary policy better than the foreign monetary
policy.
(4) The average jump contribution to total volatility
in the EMU interest rate market remains almost constant with
maturity. For the 1-year, 5-year and 7-year EMU triple A gov-
ernment bond the values are 60%, 59%, and 58%, respectively.
(5) The number of jumps on ECB and FED meeting
days overall meeting days is higher for 5-year and 7-year matu-
rities than for the 1-year maturity, indicating that market partic-
ipants change more their expectations regarding long-term rates
after the announcement. In the US Treasury market, the 1-year
average jumps on FED and ECB meeting days overall meeting
days is close to 3%, increasing respectively to nearly 23% and
26% for the 5-year and 7-year maturity. Very similar values are
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also obtained in the EMU market.
Regarding the results reported by León and Sebestyén
(2012) and by Beber and Brandt (2010), some of them are dif-
ferent than those found here. First, the jump contribution to the
total volatility shows higher values for all maturities than those
reported in León and Sebestyén (2012) for EMU bond returns
and in Beber and Brandt (2010) for US market. Second, the
contribution of jumps to the total volatility do not follow a clear
decreasing path for the maturities analyzed, in the US Treasury
interest rates the jump contribution to total volatility are re-
ported higher in the 7-year than in the 5-year maturity, and for
the EMU interest rates the jump contribution to total volatility
remains almost constant with maturity. This trend is different
from those found in León and Sebestyén (2012) and in Beber
and Brandt (2010). Third, all estimated jump intensity parame-
ters are reported positive, indicating that in this sample period
jumps are always likely to occur and happen more on longer
maturities. Four, the number of jumps on meeting days overall
meeting days increase with maturity for US rates on FED and
ECB statements and for EMU rates on FED announcements.
Only the number of jumps on ECB meeting days overall meet-
ing days decrease for the EMU rates, going in the same direction
of the results reported by León and Sebestyén (2012).
In the sense of comparing the goodness of fit of both
models, it is conducted the likelihood-ratio test, which expresses
how many times more likely the data are under one model than
the other. The statistical value of 28.32, 14.40 and 11 was ob-
tained for 1-year, 5-year, and 7-year, respectively. The critical
value for all maturities is 7.81. For all maturities, the null hy-
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Table 7 – Jump analysis for the bivariate monetary-jump
model with time-variant jump intensity and
constant jump mean.
Maturity 1-year 5-year 7-year
Average jump contribution to
total volatility - US 0.980 0.8298 0.8455
Number of jumps - US 20 330 459




Number of jumps in US
on ECB meetings days 3 19 23
Number of jumps in US
on ECB meeting days over
all ECB meeting days
0.0395 0.25 0.3026
Average jump contribution to
total volatility - EMU 0.6068 0.5930 0.5812
Number of jumps - EMU 23 228 278




Number of jumps in EMU
on FED meetings days 1 12 16
Number of jumps in EMU
on FED meeting days over
all FED meeting days
0.0192 0.2308 0.3077
Notes: The table reports the jump analysis for the bivariate monetary-
jump model with time-varying jump intensity and constant jump mean
regarding the FED and ECB meetings about the monetary policy decision.
The number of jumps in the EMU is the number of days on which the
sum of the ex-post probabilities of at least one jump on 𝑛*2𝑡 and 𝑛*3𝑡,
𝑃 (𝑛*2𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1) + 𝑃 (𝑛*3𝑡 ≥ 1|𝜑𝑡−1), is higher than 50%. The average








, respectively. The number of jumps on
meeting days overall meeting days is the ratio of the number of jumps
on meeting days to the total number of meeting days.
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pothesis is rejected with 5% level of significance in favor of the
alternative model, that is, in favor of the bivariate monetary-
jump model with time-varying jump intensity specification.
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5 Conclusion
This work investigates how relevant monetary policy
decision announcements, regarding official target rate made by
the FED and ECB, spillover in both yield curves. The bivari-
ate monetary-jump model proposed here is a mixture of the
monetary-jump model proposed by León and Sebestyén (2012)
and the bivariate GARCH-jump model proposed by Chan (2002,
2003). Besides the variance-targeting scalar VECH parametriza-
tion, this model includes a bivariate Poisson function to govern
the jump component of the model, allowing the jump intensities
to follow a time-varying autoregressive specification and generate
correlated jumps in both series in addition to each independent
jump. This model can capture smooth volatility movements and
abrupt changes in the rates of return of interest rates.
The bivariate monetary-jump model allows us to as-
sess how the monetary policy decision process affects both yield
curves prices and volatilities, the monetary policy decision pre-
dictability and effectiveness, and monetary policy spillover ef-
fects in a quest for understanding how one market might influ-
ence another. In this sense, the analysis focuses on four objec-
tives: (1) Assess the extent to which not anticipated monetary
policy decision contribute to the overall volatility in both term
structure of interest rates; (2) analyze the predictability and ef-
fectiveness of FED and ECB decisions and announcements; (3)
assess if volatility and monetary policy spillover effects between
the US and EMU yield curves exist; (4) identify two types of
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systematic jumps: jumps specific to one interest rate and jumps
that occur to both interest rates at the same time and assess the
correlation between jumps in both markets.
Regarding the first objective, the average jump contri-
bution to total volatility in both yield curves suggests the jumps
structure is very important in the process of measuring volatil-
ity in interest rate returns. For all US maturities, the jump con-
tribution to total volatility stays higher than 82%, and for the
EMUmaturities, the jumps contribute closely to 60% of the total
volatility. However, the contribution of an unanticipated mone-
tary policy decision to overall volatility is not that significant; in
both yield curves and for all maturities, the monetary surprise
component corresponds closely to only 5% of the total number of
jumps. Meaning that jumps from different natures occur in the
interest rates returns more often than the surprise component of
monetary policy decision.
The second objective can be analyzed through the num-
ber of jumps on ECB and FED meeting days overall meeting
days. In the US Treasury market, the 1-year average jumps on
FED and ECB meeting days overall meeting days is close to 3%,
increasing respectively to nearly 23% and 26% for the 5-year
and 7-year maturity. Very similar values are also obtained in the
EMU market. This suggests the predictability of both central
banks are lower for the 5-year and 7-year maturities than for the
1-year maturity, implying the FED and ECB monetary policy
decisions have a greater impact in future market expectations af-
ter the announcement. This occurs because future rates do not
anticipate monetary policy decision as shorter rates, indicating
agents are more likely to change their future monetary policy
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expectations only after the statement has been released. Foreign
monetary authority decisions generate more surprise in domes-
tic interest rate market participants than the domestic monetary
authority. This information indicates the US and EMU interest
rate market participants anticipate their own monetary policy
decisions better than the foreign monetary policy. This informa-
tion is also related to monetary policy spillover effects, which is
part of our third objective.
Concerning volatility and monetary policy spillover ef-
fects between US and EMU yield curves, the monetary-jump
model with constant jump intensity shows a different result than
the model with time-varying specification. For the model with
time-varying jump intensity, FED monetary policy decisions af-
fect the EMU bond market participants with the same impor-
tance that the ECB meetings impact the US Treasury market
participants. As for the model with constant structure, FED
monetary policy decisions report a higher monetary surprise ra-
tio, suggesting FED decisions for the EMU bond market are
more important than ECB decisions for the US Treasury in-
terest rate market. Regarding volatility spillover effects, it can
be seen in the covariance chart between those two assets that
the covariance drop during the financial crises period, the same
time the correlated jump intensity becomes large and drives both
countries’ jump arrival processes.
Finally, the monetary-jump model could identify two
types of jumps and reports that correlated jumps appear to
drive the US and EMU jump intensity processes in the financial
crises period. This characteristic suggests that, in world financial
crises, the correlated jump intensity seems more important than
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individual jump generating processes. This trend reinforced that
the 2008 financial turmoil presented the characteristic of conta-
gious between the US and EMU yield curves. The jump correla-
tion parameter was reported negative on long-term maturities,
which suggests jumps move interest rate returns in opposite di-
rections due to the time zone between the markets since FED
decision statements affect the EMU interest rate market only
on the next day. Beyond the time zone argument to explain the
negative jump correlation parameter, another suggestion may
be the difference packages of economic recovery measures imple-
mented by the FED and ECB after the crises and their impact
on long-term interest rates.
The empirical evidence suggested a high level of linkage
between the two markets, especially in the world financial crises
when correlated jumps appear to drive the jump arrival pro-
cess of both countries. Also, monetary policy decisions spillover
effects were very relevant to explain jumps in the monetary au-
thority meeting days since foreign monetary decisions appear to
create more jumps than the domestic monetary policy in the
interest rate returns. The jump structure is very important to
explain interest rate volatility; however, the monetary policy sur-
prise component reports little contribution to the overall volatil-
ity. Since FED monetary policy decisions, regarding the target
rate, are main drivers of global financial cycles that affect de-
veloped and emerging economies, further work can focus in the
linkage of FED monetary policy with other central bank deci-
sions and yield curves to evaluate if an interdependence exists




Figures 11 to 20 reports the ex-post number of jumps
and the ex-post probability of at least one jump occur for both
individual jump arrival processes and for the correlated jump ar-
rival process in both economic areas. The charts show the rising
pattern of the correlated jump arrival process during the finan-
cial crises period. The monetary-jump model was able to report
this contagious feature of the 2008 financial and economic crises.
This increasing trend can also be verified in figures 21 and 22
for the monetary-jump measure of volatility for both countries in
the period of the financial turmoil, an expected movement since
volatility is a proxy of risk and uncertainty. As for figures 23 and
24, both charts show a decreasing contribution of jumps to total
volatility in the crises period, however, the initial level shows a
quick recovery after this period, remaining at a very similar level
of jump contribution when compared the started and end point.
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Figure 11 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post number
of jumps for the
EMU.
Figure 12 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post number
of jumps for the
US.
Figure 13 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post number
of jumps for the
first individual
jump process.
Figure 14 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post number




Figure 15 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post number
of jumps for the
correlated jump
process.
Figure 16 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post proba-
bility of at least




Figure 17 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post proba-
bility of at least
one jump for the
EMU.
Figure 18 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post proba-
bility of at least
one jump for the
US.
Figure 19 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post proba-
bility of at least
one jump for the
first individual
jump process.
Figure 20 – 7 year maturity:
Ex-post proba-
bility of at least
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